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Freedom to Hack
IDO KILOVATY*
The proliferation of Internet-connected smart devices, also known as 
the “Internet of Things,” has become a major threat to privacy, user 
security, Internet security, and even national security. These threats are 
manifestations of externalities primarily resulting from a market failure 
in the Internet of Things industry, in which vendors do not have an 
incentive to implement reasonable security in the software embedded in 
devices they produce, thus creating cheap and unsecure devices. This 
Article argues that law and policy have a central role to play in making 
this digital ecosystem more secure—not only through direct regulation 
of this industry, but primarily through allowing individual security 
researchers to hack for security—or “ethical hacking.” At present, 
contractual obligations and laws that prohibit hacking, such as the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, are adopting a strict liability approach, which criminalizes almost 
any form of hacking, regardless of motivation or potential benefits. This 
Article rejects this outdated approach in the wake of ubiquitous cyber-
attacks, imperfect software, and the emerging Internet of Things 
ecosystem.
This Article argues that law and regulatory agencies should 
accommodate hacking for security purposes to allow security 
researchers to discover possible vulnerabilities, while shielding them 
from copyright infringement or criminal liability. While security 
research into software and hardware is desirable, the law by and large 
restricts such research. This results in a reality of highly unsecure 
Internet of Things devices and could potentially lead to serious harms 
to security and privacy. Such a legal accommodation should be 
supported by other legal adaptations, mainly involving regulatory 
oversight and enforcement, consistent rules for vulnerability disclosure, 
and clear distinctions between ethical and malicious hackers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyday devices and appliances are becoming more sophisticated, 
computerized, and software-backed.1 Cars, thermostats, door locks, smart 
watches, and even toasters are now powered by code and connected to the 
Internet, which offers a variety of online features that allow users to remotely 
monitor and control their devices.2 These objects are collectively referred to as 
the “Internet of Things” (IoT) to denote that Internet is no longer exclusively a 
platform for people to communicate with each other; it is now a “physical”
Internet,3 a network of “things” communicating amongst themselves while also 
collecting and transmitting user data collected by their sensors to corporations 
and state authorities.4
The proliferation of IoT devices in personal, business, and public 
environments is part of a technological shift from hardware to software.5
Physical objects are being supplemented, and even replaced, by software.6 By 
2020, it is expected that IoT will reach as many as 20 billion connected devices, 
compared to 8 billion today,7 with other estimates extending to as much as 50 
billion devices.8 The future worth of the IoT industry is also estimated in the 
hundreds of billions of dollars, should its trajectory remain as projected.9 This 
shift is preceded by a phenomenon of embedding processors into everyday 
“things.”10 In the past, this would have been immensely expensive and 
inefficient, whereas today, microprocessors are widely available and affordable, 
                                                                                                                     
1 See Marc Andreessen, Why Software Is Eating the World, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460
[https://perma.cc/Q6DN-MJ6M].
2 See infra Part 0.
3 See Bruce Schneier, Security and the Internet of Things, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/02/security_and_th.html
[https://perma.cc/85GW-ZW4P].
4 Id. (arguing that data collected about us and the things we do is available to both 
corporations and governments). 
5 See Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software,
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1673 (2016).
6 Id. at 1676.
7 See Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected “Things” Will Be in Use in 2017, Up 31
Percent from 2016, GARTNER (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/35989
17 [https://perma.cc/AGS5-7TME].
8 FTC STAFF REPORT, INTERNET OF THINGS—PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD i (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-
privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLT3-Z8BG].
9 Swaroop Poudel, Internet of Things: Underlying Technologies, Interoperability, and 
Threats to Privacy and Security, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 1009 (2016).
10 See Roberto Minerva et al., Towards a Definition of the Internet of Things (IoT),
IEEE INTERNET INITIATIVE 27 (May 27, 2015), http://iot.ieee.org/images/files/pdf/IEEE_Io
T_Towards_Definition_Internet_of_Things_Revision1_27MAY15.pdf [https://perma.cc/M
KL6-GNVY].
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and Internet speeds are constantly increasing, meaning that it is easier to 
manufacture “smart” objects that operate smoothly.11
Software, however, is not the only emerging technological feature in 
everyday objects. The uniqueness of IoT is its Internet connectivity, which 
makes it part of the global network grid, with all the pertaining conveniences 
and dangers.12 The IoT trend will most likely continue to grow and pose serious 
challenges in the future, both legally and technically. Some argue that the IoT 
development may signal “the end of ownership,”13 since copyright may stifle 
any modification to the software of these devices, but copyright law is also, in 
a way, a form of information censorship.14
However, I argue that unless a broad freedom to hack these devices for 
security purposes is recognized, at least until regulatory agencies catch up, IoT 
technology could also be the end of security and privacy, broadly speaking.15
This is particularly true considering that the complexities of IoT software will 
necessarily mean tradeoffs in terms of security, and vendors creating complex 
IoT software will have to test it for every possible attack or compromise, which 
is essentially impossible.16 Even if it were possible, experts argue that software 
engineers cannot predict future methods of attack,17 and software testing would 
                                                                                                                     
11 See BROADBAND COMM’N FOR DIG. DEV., BROADBAND DRIVES THE INTERNET OF 
THINGS, http://www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/Media%20Corner%20Files%
20and%20pdfs/Broadband%20drives%20the%20Internet%20of%20Things.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LHA2-CK3W] (“Broadband represents the vital final piece of the puzzle. 
The need for always-on bandwidth combined with potentially huge numbers of networked 
objects—some estimate many billion individually connected devices—imply an immense 
data throughput on networks.”); see also LOPEZ RESEARCH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) 2 (2013), http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/solutions/trends/
iot/introduction_to_IoT_november.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HXC-K59E] (identifying the 
many features of today’s tech world allowing the proliferation of IoT: IPv6, battery life, 
decreased cost of wireless networks, and broadband speeds). 
12 See Maria Farrell, The Internet of Things—Who Wins, Who Loses?, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/14/internet-of-things-
winners-and-losers-privacy-autonomy-capitalism [https://perma.cc/9UTD-EK6K] (“With 
its insecure devices with multiple points of data access, user applications that routinely 
exfiltrate our sensor data, activity logs and personal contacts, and a Sisyphean uphill struggle 
required to exert any control over who knows what about us, the internet of things does more 
than create whole new cyber-security attack surfaces. It is so riddled with metastasising 
points of vulnerability that you begin to sense that these are not bugs, but features.”).
13 See Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563, 589 
(2016) (quoting AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP (2016)).
14 See Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of 
Ideas and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 348–56 (2003).
15 See Samuelson, supra note 13, at 598. 
16 Trevor A. Thompson, Terrorizing the Technological Neighborhood Watch: The 
Alienation and Deterrence of the “White Hats” Under the CFAA, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
537, 543 (2009).
17 See id. at 545–47 (“Even when software performs as intended, software cannot fully 
protect users from themselves.”); see also Capers Jones, Software Defect-Removal 
Efficiency, 29 COMPUTER 94, 94–95 (1996); Note, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I 
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also not solve the social engineering threat that targets the unwitting cooperation 
of users,18 which involves “opening an infected file, clicking on a malicious 
hyperlink, sending personal information to a phishing Web site, or manually 
adjusting security settings.”19 However, it is still believed that the vast majority 
of security breaches are caused by flaws in software.20
While embedding access to the global network within ordinary objects 
offers many advantages—it makes devices more dynamic, customizable, user-
friendly (to an extent), and, generally, smarter21—it also poses a series of 
security challenges that, if they remain unaddressed, may represent actual 
threats to the “digital order” in the form of rampant security breaches and 
privacy violations.22
The major problem with today’s unsecure IoT environment is that it is 
largely a result of a market failure.23 The market failure manifests itself in 
multiple ways. First, the industry is not legally bound by any particular 
guidelines on security and privacy;24 a sizable number of devices are therefore 
unsecure, offering an opportunity for criminals and other exploiters to commit 
malicious cyber-attacks against innocent users.25 Further, IoT can also be used 
as a proxy for larger attacks against critical infrastructure, including the very 
backbone of the Internet—an externality that neither vendors nor IoT users 
necessarily care about, because they do not directly experience the adverse 
effects of those externalities.26 Second, IoT vendors have no economic incentive 
                                                                                                                     
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Worm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2449 (2006)
[hereinafter Immunizing the Internet] (“[I]t is much harder to ‘patch’ a person than a 
computer.”). 
18 See Thompson, supra note 16, at 545.
19 See id. at 547.
20 See Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 
1060 (2011) (“Gartner calculates that 75% of security breaches result from software flaws.”).
21 See Minerva et al., supra note 10, at 27.
22 See Bambauer & Day, supra note 20, at 1058. 
23 See Schneier, supra note 3.
24 See Carolina Alonso & Alan L. Friel, Connecting the Dots Between Security 
Practices and Legal Obligations: California’s Connected Devices Bill, DATA PRIVACY 
MONITOR (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/internet-of-things/connecting-
the-dots-between-security-practices-and-legal-obligations/ [http://perma.cc/NFR8-644X].
25 See, e.g., Dan Bilefsky, Hackers Use New Tactic at Austrian Hotel: Locking the 
Doors, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/world/europe/
hotel-austria-bitcoin-ransom.html [on file with the Ohio State Law Journal] (explaining that 
computer systems responsible for the electronic key system were hit with ransomware); Kyle 
York, Read Dyn’s Statement on the 10/21/2016 DNS DDoS Attack, ORACLE DYN BLOG (Oct. 
22, 2016), https://dyn.com/blog/dyn-statement-on-10212016-ddos-attack/ [https://perma.cc/
HU6V-EC2W]
26 See York, supra note 25 (explaining how an IoT-enabled denial-of-service attack 
against DNS provider Dyn made it impossible for Internet users on the East Coast to reach 
various websites); see also Bruce Schneier, Your WiFi-Connected Thermostat Can Take 
Down the Whole Internet. We Need New Regulations, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2016), 
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to offer security as a feature in their products, primarily because consumers are 
not showing strong preferences toward security and privacy as higher priorities 
than lower prices.27 At the very least, informational gaps between vendors and 
consumers lead to an uninformed and inefficient choice by consumers.28 The 
Senate has recently recognized this particular market failure and has proposed 
IoT industry-focused legislation.29
Ransomware attacks30 are only one example of malicious activity that 
criminals or nation-states may use against unsecure IoT devices, and reports 
indicate that ransomware attacks against IoT are already taking place at 
present.31 Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks,32 data breaches, and 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/03/your-wifi-connected-
thermostat-can-take-down-the-whole-internet-we-need-new-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/
4H2G-P7HM] (“An additional market failure illustrated by the Dyn attack is that neither the 
seller nor the buyer of those devices cares about fixing the vulnerability. The owners of those 
devices don’t care. They wanted a webcam—or thermostat, or refrigerator—with nice 
features at a good price. Even after they were recruited into this botnet, they still work fine—
you can’t even tell they were used in the attack.”).
27 See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating a Legitimate, 
Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market for Software Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ. L. REV.
753, 781–82 (2016).
28 See RICHARD A. SPINELLO, CYBERETHICS: MORALITY AND LAW IN CYBERSPACE 
151–53 (2011) (explaining that the loss of privacy is a market failure).
29 See MARK WARNER ET AL., INTERNET OF THINGS: CYBERSECURITY IMPROVEMENT 
ACT OF 2017 1, 4 (2017), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/8/6/861d66b8-
93bf-4c93-84d0-6bea67235047/8061BCEEBF4300EC702B4E894247D0E0.iot-cybesecurity-
improvement-act---fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/94QD-KF7Q].
30 See Kim Zetter, What Is Ransomware? A Guide to the Global Cyberattack’s Scary 
Method, WIRED (May 14, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/hacker-lexicon-guide-
ransomware-scary-hack-thats-rise [https://perma.cc/4ZPC-4WAX] (explaining that 
ransomware is malware that prevents access to data resident on a target computer by 
encrypting data files, without the user being able to access them until he or she pays the 
ransom).
31 See Bilefsky, supra note 25 (explaining that computer systems responsible for the 
electronic key system was hit with ransomware); cf. Nathaniel Mott, Ransomware Didn’t
Lock People in Their Hotel Rooms, TOM’S HARDWARE (Jan. 30, 2017), 
http://www.tomshardware.com/news/ransomware-didnt-lock-hotel-rooms,33528.html 
[https://perma.cc/7QNT-2D4X] (claiming that the Austrian hotel ransomware was not quite 
as reported, but a regular ransomware affecting generation of new keys). 
32 See Immunizing the Internet, supra note 17, at 2444 (DDoS attacks are “self-
propagating worms [who] take control of vulnerable computers . . . the attackers then 
command the computer to flood targeted systems with requests for information, preventing 
legitimate traffic from getting through.”).
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surveillance33 are all possible threats to IoT users if its security problem remains 
unaddressed.34
Recently, Bruce Schneier, a (arguably the) leading cybersecurity and 
cryptography expert, referred to the increasing prevalence of IoT devices as a 
“World-Sized Web,”35 denoting that this ubiquitous network of devices will 
benefit corporations seeking to maximize profits, open new vulnerabilities36 for 
criminals to exploit, and aid totalitarian regimes throughout the world.37 It is 
almost a cliché in the information security community that IoT devices are very 
often unsecure and relatively easy to hack38 due to an abundancy of software 
flaws, unpatched vulnerabilities, and even an inability to “patch” these devices’
flaws once they are discovered.39 This is largely enabled by market forces, 
which pressure vendors to create cheaper devices at the cost of disregarding 
security and privacy.40 In other words, this reality is enabled by the tech 
industry’s drive to innovate at an accelerated pace,41 while working under the 
                                                                                                                     
33 See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth 
Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 805 (2016) (arguing that the Internet of 
Things present new possibilities for surveillance thus challenging established Fourth 
Amendment doctrine). 
34 See generally Michael J. Covington & Rush Carskadden, Threat Implications of the 
Internet of Things, 5th INT’L CONF. CYBER. CONFLICT (2013) (overviewing the threats and 
risks posed by the Internet of Things).
35 See Bruce Schneier, The Internet of Things Will Be the World’s Biggest Robot,
SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/02/
the_internet_of_1.html [https://perma.cc/9PDT-37WA].
36 For the purposes of this Article, “vulnerability” is broadly defined as “a set of 
conditions that may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an 
information system. It is often a simple oversight or weakness in a computer’s software that 
lets a hacker manipulate computer data.” Edward H. Freeman, Vulnerability Disclosure: The 
Strange Case of Bret McDanel, 16 INFO. SYS. SECURITY 127, 127 (2007). 
37 See Schneier, supra note 35.
38 See Bruce Schneier, IoT Teddy Bear Leaked Personal Audio Recordings, SCHNEIER 
ON SECURITY (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/03/iot_teddy_
bear_.html [https://perma.cc/VKD2-4HJQ].
39 Patchability—the ability to release security updates to fix vulnerabilities—is still 
unavailable in many IoT devices. See Bruce Schneier, The Internet of Things Is Wildly 
Insecure—And Often Unpatchable, WIRED (Jan. 6, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/01/
theres-no-good-way-to-patch-the-internet-of-things-and-thats-a-huge-problem/
[https://perma.cc/5PXK-DK9K] (“[I]t’s often impossible to patch the software or upgrade 
the components to the latest version.”).
40 See The Connected World: Examining the Internet of Things: Hearing on S. Hrg. 
114–237 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transport., 114th Cong. 119 (2015) 
(“The computer chips that power these systems are often cheaply produced, rarely updated 
or patched, and highly susceptible to hacks . . . . These devices will be cheap, even 
disposable, and the incentives for the manufacturer to provide regular security updates will 
be minimal.”).
41 See Schneier, supra note 39 (For example, “The chip manufacturer is busy shipping 
the next version of the chip, and the ODM is busy upgrading its product to work with this 
next chip. Maintaining the older chips and products just isn’t a priority. And the software is 
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assumption that embedding cybersecurity could stifle this rapid innovation 
rate.42
To address the abovementioned market failure, this Article argues that 
outsourcing some of the vulnerability discovery to third-party actors—security 
researchers—would bolster IoT security. These researchers essentially employ 
hacking techniques for the purpose of enhancing security—in other words, they 
think and act like a hacker for the company in order to ward off future criminal 
hacking.
Currently, federal law imposes significant limitations on unsolicited 
hacking for security research through both civil penalties and criminalization of 
certain hacking activities,43 leading to fears of legal jeopardy among members 
of the cybersecurity community.44 Exceptions to these legal sanctions, if they 
exist, are typically very narrow and would still put benign actors under the threat 
of legal consequences from vendors, thus limiting the amount of overall security 
research as well as the ability to present such research in an academic setting for 
further study and development.45
In order to enhance IoT security, the law, as well as the institutions creating, 
interpreting, and applying the law, should allow hacking for the purpose of 
security research. Such “benign” hacking would reveal flaws and weaknesses in 
software that, if exploited by malicious actors, could affect not only individuals’
personal security and privacy, but even U.S. national security.46 This approach 
will increase the efficiency of vulnerability disclosure and patching because 
there will be no chilling effect on the activity of revealing software 
                                                                                                                     
old, even when the device is new. For example, one survey of common home routers found 
that the software components were four to five years older than the device.”).
42 See Adam Thierer & Andrea O’Sullivan, Leave the Internet of Things Alone, U.S.
NEWS (June 12, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/20
17-06-12/dont-stifle-the-internet-of-things-with-regulation [https://perma.cc/HE4L-YEZT]
(arguing that heavy security regulation on IoT will place an undue burden on the IoT 
industry). 
43 See Samuelson, supra note 13, at 568.
44 UC BERKELEY SCH. OF INFO., CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH: ADDRESSING THE LEGAL 
BARRIERS AND DISINCENTIVES 1 (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/sites/
default/files/cybersec-research-nsf-workshop.pdf [https://perma.cc/59RR-QSMH].
45 See Bambauer & Day, supra note 20, at 1054 (arguing that IP laws stifle critical 
security research and blocks or limits the ability to share information relating to security 
flaws) (citing Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1974 
(2006)). 
46 See Melissa E. Hathaway, Cyber Security: An Economic and National Security 
Crisis, 16 INTELLIGENCER: J. U.S. INTELLIGENCE STUD. 31 (2008); see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., DOD Announces Digital Vulnerability Disclosure Policy and “Hack the Army” Kick-
Off (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-
View/Article/1009956/dod-announces-digital-vulnerability-disclosure-policy-and-hack-
the-army-kick-off [https://perma.cc/GQ8M-WQ3W] (describing how then-Secretary of 
Defense, Ash Carter, underscored that “[w]e want to encourage computer security 
researchers to help us improve our defenses. This policy gives them a legal pathway to 
bolster the department’s cybersecurity and ultimately the nation’s security.”).
2019] FREEDOM TO HACK 463
vulnerabilities.47 To be clear, security research is only one part of the overall 
cybersecurity concoction, which should include, in Lawrence Lessig’s words, 
an optimal balance between “public law and private fences.”48 There is a race 
between benevolent and malicious actors in cyberspace, and the argument 
advanced by this paper seeks to empower actors who wish to improve the overall 
security and privacy of IoT.
The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that advancing IoT technologies 
will transform our lives entirely by becoming a substantial part of our society. 
The ubiquity of sensors, the physicality of most IoT devices, and the absence of 
reasonable default security standards could lead to major threats to individual 
and collective security and privacy. The rapid development of this field has 
already led to regulatory inefficiency and a serious market failure, enabling 
vendors to manufacture and sell unsecure IoT devices globally.49 Providing an 
incentive for the broader security community to become involved in fixing this 
ecosystem without fear of legal jeopardy will make individual users safer while 
also protecting critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, power plants, and the 
Internet backbone, from IoT externalities.50
This paper will proceed in four parts. In Part I, I will discuss the 
phenomenon of IoT—“the world of hackable things”—and provide an overview 
of the market failures at play. These market failures are at the crux of this 
Article’s argument because they allow threats to individual users and third-
parties to flourish as a result of unsecure IoT devices. Part II will be dedicated 
to introducing the security research environment, in which different types of 
hackers and motivations are shaping reality. In Part III, I will focus on the legal 
hurdles impeding “the freedom to hack”—mainly contractual provisions, 
federal prohibition of circumvention of technological protection measures 
(TPMs) in the Digital Copyright and Millennium Act, and criminal liability for 
unauthorized access to protected computers within the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act. Finally, Part IV will propose a concrete framework for creating a 
normative, technical, and institutional environment in which security 
researchers can achieve their goal of making software more secure by 
distinguishing benevolent from malicious actors, strengthening regulatory 
oversight and enforcement, clarifying statutory boundaries, regulating 
                                                                                                                     
47 See Malena Carollo, Influencers: Lawsuits to Prevent Reporting Vulnerabilities Will 
Chill Research, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Passcode/Passcode-Influencers/2015/0929/Influencers-Lawsuits-to-prevent-
reporting-vulnerabilities-will-chill-research [https://perma.cc/7HSK-MLGB] (providing 
data that 74% of leading experts (referred to as “the Influencers”) believe that lawsuits 
against vulnerability disclosure in public will have chilling effects on security research). 
48 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 170 (2006). 
49 See Schneier, supra note 3.
50 See Immunizing the Internet, supra note 17, at 2443 (2006) (“Not only does current 
policy create the wrong incentives regarding cybercrime, it does too little to encourage 
computer hackers and computer users to contribute actively to Internet security.”).
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patchability, creating a consistent procedure for disclosure of vulnerabilities, 
and tackling security by obscurity.
II. INTERNET OF HACKABLE THINGS
It was probably unimaginable at the conception of the Internet that one day 
it would be used to connect everyday “things” to it. The development of this 
phenomenon allowed for machine-to-machine communication, the 
“communication between . . . entities that do not necessarily need any direct 
human intervention.”51 Whether through a smart thermostat that learns a user’s
temperature-setting patterns,52 a bracelet that tells a user how well she exercises 
and sleeps,53 a webcam that can wirelessly transmit photos and videos,54 a smart 
toaster offering the perfect toast,55 or a car that has the ability to connect to the 
Internet and offer navigation services, self-diagnosis tools, and remote control 
through widely used smartphones,56 such machine-to-machine networks 
abound.
There is a growing understanding that “things with computers embedded in 
them” are becoming “computers with things attached to them.”57 This means 
that a whole set of legal issues traditionally pertaining to computers are 
transposed into the area of ordinary daily objects, but those ordinary daily 
objects now have a few extra features that make questions of legality 
tremendously challenging.58 For example, previously, if a toaster 
malfunctioned, it would have been mainly a consumer protection problem, 
whereas today, it might as well be a telecommunications problem, involving a 
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whole set of challenges pertaining to privacy and security and, in more extreme 
circumstances, national security.59
While the general phenomenon of IoT is somewhat intuitive in today’s
hyperconnected world, there is no official or widely adopted definition of the 
technology.60 One definition is “the ability of everyday objects to connect to the 
Internet and to send and receive data,”61 a feature that was previously 
nonexistent in everyday things. Another definition provides that IoT is “a
network of items—each embedded with sensors—which are connected to the 
Internet”;62 another similar definition characterizes IoT as a “[s]ystem where 
the Internet is connected to the physical world via ubiquitous sensors.”63 While 
Internet connectivity is itself quite intuitive, often missing in defining IoT is an 
emphasis on the sensors, actuators, and central processing units (CPUs), or 
cloud computers,64 that often comprise the IoT ecosystem.
Unlike personal computers (desktop, laptops, smartphones, and the like), 
IoT devices often lack a user interface, or at least one that allows control over 
security and privacy features.65 IoT should also be contrasted from popular 
operating systems, which are supported by large tech companies who constantly 
offer updates to the software.66 This largely means that the degree of user control 
over the configuration of a device is significantly limited and is usually 
controlled by the vendor, if at all.67 It is expected that the vendor will provide 
reasonable security already built into the device—“security by design”—but 
unfortunately, the current state of affairs in IoT has proven otherwise.68
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Understanding the physicality of IoT is crucial if we are to create solutions 
to the wide range of resulting legal challenges. IoT insecurity is not merely a 
theoretical threat—it is an actual danger to our very homes.69 Typically, an IoT 
device is comprised of three components—a sensor, a CPU (or cloud computer), 
and an actuator.70 While a sensor collects data about its users and 
environment,71 the CPU (or “the cloud”) processes that data and potentially 
commands the actuator to take appropriate actions.72 These two components are 
essential for controlling the actuator, which is an “output device[] that 
implement[s] decisions.”73 For example, a sensor could be a thermostat used to 
monitor the temperature, with a connected CPU tasked with determining 
whether the air conditioner should be turned on or off, which would be 
accomplished through the actuator, the actual object that this whole system was 
built to control.74 In a way, sensors are the “eyes and ears” of the Internet, and 
the actuators are “hands and feet.”75 The CPUs, in this analogy, would be the 
brain, since they process data and react to it according to certain predetermined 
software-based rules.76
Since a typical user has little to no control over the security features (and 
many other features) of their specific device, enhancing the security of the 
device will necessarily require the user to tinker with the software, which could 
breach contractual obligations contained within End-User License Agreements 
(EULA), violate the anti-circumvention rules of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA),77 or trigger criminal liability and prosecution if the 
manner in which they access these devices is seemingly unauthorized—which 
includes virtually any form of hacking.78
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Therefore, users often have to rely on vendors’ practices of vulnerability 
patching and security by design, which do not always exist in a market of 
accelerated innovation and competition, particularly in cheaper devices.79 In 
many instances, a vendor’s decision whether to provide vulnerability patches is 
a question of risk assessment and market forces—and market forces, particularly 
in the tech industry, do not always work in favor of consumers (if we assume 
that privacy and security are in the interest of consumers).80 This is perhaps 
more alarming considering that the cost of security breaches to users in 
aggregate is significantly higher than the cost to vendors, which could explain 
the gap in expectations between vendors and users.81 In other words, “[s]ystems 
are particularly prone to failure when the person guarding them is not the person 
who suffers when they fail.”82
A. The Economics of IoT 
Many assume that the market will eventually solve the security and privacy 
problems of the IoT ecosystem.83 But this may not be accurate given that these 
problems are themselves a result of a market failure.84 The unlikelihood of a 
market solution is particularly stark when examined in terms of the costs 
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associated with cyber-attacks on IoT, which are often experienced by third 
parties and are therefore considered externalities.85 Because such externalities 
involve a wide variety of sectors and actors, with varying degrees of costs and 
benefits, the prospect of an efficient transaction is unlikely.86
When it comes to externalities in software, it is often believed that software 
vulnerabilities are “inevitable externalities” because flawless software does not 
yet exist.87 This is further exacerbated by the pressure placed on vendors by 
competition to release software to the market as fast as they can.88 While this 
trend is generally true, it is still possible to make software better through 
constant fixing of vulnerabilities, therefore reaching a socially optimal level of 
security.89
Furthermore, companies who decide to enter the IoT market do not always 
have the experience needed to implement security features in their devices.90
There is a sizable degree of opportunism when it comes to new players in the 
IoT industry, making unsecure IoT devices pervasive.91
In addition, IoT devices are largely inexpensive and disposable, which 
precludes most costly security features.92 The literature identifies additional 
reasons for ubiquitous unsecure IoT devices—lack of experience in data 
security among vendors, absence of processing power in most IoT devices for 
“robust security measures such as encryption,” and unforeseen threats,93 given 
that the attackers are humans who constantly adapt and change their methods.94
The recurring theme is the inability of vendors to fully solve the potential 
security flaws in IoT devices on their own. 
At the same time, the users themselves are often unaware of the risks; IoT 
architecture is often driven by vendors attempting to reduce costs, and the 
individual consumer is typically interested in a product’s features, rather than 
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its security settings.95 Whereas computers have been hackable since their 
conception, the IoT ecosystem increases the stakes to a far greater state of 
urgency.96 This is largely enabled by the physicality of IoT, which can cause 
serious physical harms, and the ubiquitous sensors, which pose a privacy 
concern to users.97 This notion is further supported by the unwillingness of 
certain tech companies to patch their software if it does not yield an effective 
cost-benefit analysis.98 Furthermore, while security and privacy are certainly 
important to consumers, it is unclear whether consumers will agree to pay more 
for a product that is more secure, even if current vendor-user informational gaps 
are decreased.99 This suggests that even informing users of the risks is unlikely 
to solve the problem of unsecure IoT.
The classic solution to externalities resulting from market failures is 
government intervention in the form of legislation and regulation.100 This 
Article takes another approach—legislation and regulation of the IoT industry 
are certainly required, but they could be far more efficient in conjunction with 
the lifting of burdens constraining security researchers. In other words, the 
market failure described in this subchapter can be mitigated by security 
researchers improving software quality through ethical hacking. 
B. The Technology of IoT
IoT offers a convenience not previously available in offline objects. First, 
the user has some remote control over certain features of the device, often from 
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a smartphone or personal computer.101 She has the ability to customize and 
monitor the functionality of her appliances, though this is often limited through 
the user interface provided by the vendor.102 Second, IoT technology equips 
vendors with the ability to optimize and improve their products through 
processing user data generated by the devices.103 However, this comes at a cost, 
since consumer data may also be used in negative ways, such as aggressive 
advertising,104 sale to third parties,105 or enhancement of surveillance 
capabilities.106 Third, IoT technology offers interoperability between devices, 
which, though it is yet to be fully developed, allows devices to communicate 
with each other.107 These benefits may sometimes even relate to the health, 
quality of life, and wellbeing of the user.108 Insulin pumps and pacemakers are 
examples of IoT applications in healthcare that revolutionized diagnosis and 
medical treatment, making patients’ health much more manageable.109
Cybersecurity risks and threats existed long before the advent of IoT,110 and 
the argument made by this Article could apply equally to IoT and non-IoT 
environments, since software will have flaws regardless of the platform on 
which it runs. However, the IoT ecosystem creates a serious challenge and 
shakes up some basic cybersecurity assumptions—it significantly broadens the 
attack surface that hackers can use, and the level of harm to autonomy is also 
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far greater, thus trivializing hacking in general but also making it more 
personal.111 This will result in more opportunistic hacking, whereby users’
security or privacy may be compromised for potential criminal ends.112
Law and regulation will find it increasingly difficult to address IoT hacking, 
due to its immense pervasiveness, volume, and trans-border effects and 
origins.113 This will leave the most trivial hacking activities unaddressed from 
a law enforcement perspective.114 The argument in this Article, therefore, 
proposes to enhance security by fixing vulnerabilities through a legal system 
that legitimizes the activities undertaken by security researchers. These 
researchers employ hacking and reverse-engineering techniques for the purpose 
of identifying security flaws and reporting them to the respective vendor and, 
eventually, the public. 
The following subparts elaborate on why the IoT ecosystem is particularly 
challenging in the cybersecurity context—sensors are everywhere, processors 
are operating physical objects, and the distinctions between software and 
hardware are eroding. These IoT-specific challenges are creating a particularly 
vulnerable environment.
1. The Ubiquity of Sensors
The IoT ecosystem is creating a world of ubiquitous sensors.115 These 
sensors are the eyes and ears of the Internet, collecting data about the 
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environment and processing and possibly transmitting that data elsewhere.116
These sensors are working continuously, and they are everywhere.117 IoT 
devices enable not only data about direct computer use but also data about 
driving, home heating and cooling, food stored in a refrigerator, pulse and blood 
pressure, sleep patterns, and much more.118
These distributed data can tell a lot about a specific person. The most private 
and nonintuitive pieces of information about a user are constantly collected by 
IoT devices and may enable misuse for criminal, business, law enforcement, and 
other purposes.119 The richness of data within the IoT ecosystem has also led to 
law enforcement finding this space appealing for surveillance.120
2. Physicality
A significant characteristic of IoT is its physicality. Processors embedded 
in IoT devices are tasked to operate actual, physical equipment, with tangible 
consequences in the physical world.121 Think of a smart thermostat, which 
learns about the preferences of the user but is also tasked to turn on or off a piece 
of equipment—the AC or furnace—when certain conditions are met. In this 
way, the IoT device commands the actuator, meaning that any meddling with 
IoT could have physical ramifications due to actuators malfunctioning, at times 
posing danger to physical security.122 Examples include a vehicle not 
responding to its driver’s actions,123 a disabled insulin pump,124 and a garage 
door that won’t open.125
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In other words, today’s everyday objects are creating telecommunications 
problems that challenge notions of security and privacy. These challenges are 
similar whether we talk about healthcare equipment, household objects, or 
transportation. The effects, however, may be tremendously different—a
malfunctioning pacemaker could lead to death, whereas a disabled wearable 
smartwatch is a matter of inconvenience or, at most, a privacy violation.
3. Software and Hardware Distinction 
Although the growing role and share of software in the overall IoT 
environment cannot be overstated, hardware also poses a host of challenges to 
the security and privacy associated with IoT.126 For example, researchers at the 
University of Michigan have recently learned that a CPU manufactured overseas
had a backdoor built by design into the CPU.127 This enables a small portion of 
the CPU to be used as an entryway for malware, which can then obtain control 
over the device.128 Since IoT devices have CPUs embedded in them, this 
represents an actual threat to the integrity and resilience of IoT.129
From a security and privacy perspective, both the software and the hardware 
need to be regulated and monitored for potential vulnerabilities that could affect 
the normal functioning of a device. Regulatory agencies in the United States are 
increasingly focusing their efforts on software, which many believe will be 
“eating the world” and taking over the digital sphere.130 But even if this 
prediction is accurate, hardware may still be designed in a way that allows 
exploitation, particularly if it is under-regulated due to the appeal of software 
regulation. Hardware represents an even bigger “black-box” problem, since it is 
extremely time consuming and complicated to determine how a specific 
computer component works, whereas software is relatively easier to grasp—as
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security researchers have demonstrated recently.131 Therefore, the analysis 
provided by this Article, while focusing mostly on software, could still be 
applicable to security research into hardware. 
C. The Threats of IoT
The characteristics of sensor abundancy and general physicality of IoT lead 
us to a third attribute, which is particularly alarming. IoT devices are not 
typically manufactured with robust or even minimal security standards 
(technical, and possibly mechanical).132 The IoT market failure results in 
vendors not implementing security in their IoT devices, mostly due to 
competition—in other words, in order to reduce manufacturing costs and offer 
a cheaper product.133 On the other hand, the average consumer does not 
typically demand strong security features, most likely due to informational 
gaps.134
This suggests that lack of IoT security is a global problem, since the same 
security-lacking devices would be present in the United States just as in other 
parts of the world. Regardless, the United States has an important role to play 
from a legal perspective by setting robust standards and best practices for the 
rest of the world to follow, including the ethical hacking of IoT devices 
advanced by this Article. In addition, many IoT vendors are based in the United 
States and fall under the jurisdiction of U.S. laws and regulations,135 and so 
ethical hacking within the United States would secure both domestic devices as 
well as those that are exported to elsewhere in the world.
The IoT revolution comes with a price. While the ability of everyday objects 
to connect to the Internet offers a broad range of advantages, it also poses a set 
of specific challenges, stemming from the vulnerabilities that these devices have 
almost by default. The literature generally identifies three major threats with 
today’s IoT ecosystem—privacy, individual user security, and third-party 
security.136
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First, since IoT sensors collect data about their respective users and their 
environment, unauthorized actors may attempt to access that personal 
information for a variety of reasons.137 Having security features within an IoT 
device could make it much harder for these unauthorized actors to access 
personal information. However, privacy breaches could then still be committed 
by vendors and other third parties who seek to monetize the collected data, 
which could also be labeled as a privacy risk.
Second, malicious actors may try to hack into IoT devices and meddle with 
the functionality of the device. For example, hackers may decide to shut down 
a car’s engine,138 lock a hotel room while demanding ransom,139 or disable a 
pacemaker.140 These are security risks confined to the user.
Third, IoT devices may be used individually (a single IoT device) or 
collectively (an “army” of compromised IoT devices) to facilitate an attack or 
breach targeting another computer system.141 In this case, the IoT is used merely 
as a proxy, which allows the hacker to have more disruptive power (if multiple 
IoT devices are used for a specific attack) and to mask her or his identity.142
This is the manifestation of the externalities discussed supra. For example, a 
hundred thousand compromised IoT devices were used to mount a distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attack against Domain Name System (DNS) provider 
Dyn.143 The Dyn attack made it impossible for Internet users to access websites 
like Twitter, Netflix, and Reddit.144 This is a security risk against third parties—
against the Internet.
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1. User Privacy 
IoT devices often generate data about the consumer, which raises the risk of 
these data being compromised.145 Many consumers would not be able to 
differentiate between an Internet-connected object and its offline counterpart in 
terms of the potential privacy implications.146 Data collected by IoT devices 
may pose a host of privacy concerns.147 For example, in the case of an IoT 
device used to measure blood alcohol—the Breathometer—collected data may 
impact “employment decisions; criminal liability implications; and health, life, 
or car insurance ramifications.”148 The data collection, retention, and disposal 
policies of a specific manufacturer are not always communicated to the 
consumer in a transparent and accessible manner.149 This is of course not unique 
to the Breathometer, as other IoT devices collect sensitive personal data as well.
These problematic uses of personal information are not the end of the story. 
Certain devices might require the use of payment methods and passwords, 
which could be accessed and misused by cyber criminals seeking financial 
gain.150 If this sensitive information is not properly secured, the number of 
vulnerabilities and compromises will increase, exposing personal information 
to malicious actors.
Another major problem that is currently emerging in the privacy law 
scholarship is sensor fusion151—when innocuous and seemingly insignificant 
data collected by an individual IoT sensor could be used to make inferences 
about the user when paired with data collected from other IoT sensors. 
Collectively, the data could be used to make near-certain inferences about the 
user, though the individual pieces of data would have no meaning on their 
own.152 For example, data from a smartphone’s gyroscope could be used to 
determine the driving habits of a user; when paired with an IoT pacemaker, the 
combination of these data can yield an inference about the emotional state and 
mood of the user.153 Scholars identify a long list of inferences that would be 
possible under the emerging IoT ecosystem of data collection—“a user’s mood; 
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stress levels; personality type; bipolar disorder; demographics (e.g., gender, 
marital status, job status, age); smoking habits; overall wellbeing; progression 
of Parkinson’s disease; sleep patterns; happiness; levels of exercise; and types 
of physical activity or movement.”154 Considering how personal and sensitive 
some of these data are, IoT devices should allow for stronger security to prevent 
breaches that could be devastating to users. 
Daniel Solove calls this problem “data aggregation” and argues that, 
“[v]iewed in isolation, each piece of our day-to-day information is not all that 
telling; viewed in combination, it begins to paint a portrait about our 
personalities.”155 The bottom line is that malicious actors have many methods 
of abusing private information they collect without authorization, particularly if 
they can collect that information across multiple IoT devices. 
It must be noted that many of the data described in this subpart would not 
be considered personally identifiable information (PII), which, if compromised, 
imposes notification responsibilities on vendors.156 However, PII does not 
typically include sensor data, or anonymized data, which is often re-
identifiable.157 This difficulty seems to suggest that the focus at present should 
be on enhancing IoT security until federal and state regulations address the full 
breadth of data that ought to be protected by vendors. At present, relying on 
state laws regulating notification of data breaches would not necessarily solve 
the problem of sensor fusion.
2. User Security
Vulnerabilities in a specific device may facilitate potential exploitations 
against that specific device and, consequently, its user.158 The primary target in 
this case is not the data in the device but rather the device’s functionality. For 
example, a hacker may decide to attack a thermostat using a ransomware 
method, meaning that the user will be unable to use the thermostat until she or 
he pays the ransom.159 The data are not the primary interest for the hacker 
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here—whereas disrupting the normal functioning of the device is.160 This hack 
is also enabled by weak security standards and vulnerabilities in software.161
Recently, an Austrian hotel suffered a ransomware attack targeting its 
smart-locks.162 The attack locked up hotel rooms until the hotel gave up and 
paid the ransom in order to restore the functioning of the locks. In that case, 
hackers did not care about who used the locks, or how, or when.163
User security may take a more serious form if the target is a life-sustaining 
IoT device such as the pacemaker. In fact, security researchers revealed recently 
that pacemakers have nineteen security vulnerabilities and are plagued with as 
many as 8,600 security flaws.164 In addition, security researchers were able to 
hack into insulin pumps and disable their medicine delivery settings.165
Potentially, a hacker exploiting one or more of these vulnerabilities could cause 
a life-threatening situation, ranging from a serious bodily harm to the user or, in 
extreme situations, even death.166
Vulnerable IoT devices could also be used to access the network through 
which they connect to the Internet, which would expose other devices on the 
network to potential compromise.167 Even if a specific vendor employs the 
strictest security features for their IoT devices, that would not necessarily 
protect all IoT devices within a household, as there are many vendors with 
varying degrees of IoT security implementations.168 This is analogous in a way 
to the Target breach, which surprisingly was directed not at Target’s computer 
network but rather at a contractor who had weaker data-protection standards.169
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That hack resulted in forty million credit cards being stolen in one of the biggest 
data breaches in recent years.170
The bottom line is that a compromise to user security can range in its effects 
from inconvenience, such as the device being slowed down, to complete 
disruption of the device, to a life-threatening situation, depending on the 
targeted device, motivation, and the method of exploitation employed. 
3. Third-Party Security 
The proliferation of IoT creates an environment of potentially millions of 
vulnerable devices. This enables hackers to create enslaved IoT devices that can 
be used as a proxy for attacking third parties—commonly referred to as 
“botnets.”171 Botnets are essentially armies of Internet-connected devices 
compromised through a malware that infects them and allows the attacker (the 
“bot master”) to command that group of devices.172 The most intuitive form of 
third-party security risk due to IoT botnets is a DDoS attack.173 The key in a 
DDoS attack (as opposed to a DoS attack) is in the overwhelming volume of 
requests, which essentially shuts down the target due to its unavailable 
bandwidth for responding to legitimate requests of service.174
In October 2016, a malware named Mirai created a botnet out of a hundred 
thousand compromised IoT devices and used it to mount a DDoS attack against 
a DNS service provider, Dyn.175 DNS is the basic protocol that translates 
alphanumerical addresses (www.nytimes.com, for example) to numerical IP 
addresses (like 192.168.1.182), which are then translated into a computer’s
binary language in blocks of eight bits (11000000 10101000 00000001 
10110110).176 The Internet’s TCP/IP protocol works with binary addresses, 
which it “understands,” whereas alphanumerical addresses are a convention that 
enables humans to conveniently browse the Internet without having to 
memorize a list of numerical IP addresses.177 This structure is an easy target for 
a malicious actor who wishes to shut down portions of the World Wide Web 
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and make it impossible for the average user to access websites and services 
online.178
III. THE SECURITY RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT
In cybersecurity, it is essential to understand the enemy in order to resolve 
the threats and challenges that exist largely due to certain forms of hacking. 
Hacking tends to have a negative connotation—it frequently implies 
malevolent, possibly illegal, activity in relation to computers and networks.179
But hacking culture is more diverse than that. Criminally motivated hackers, or 
“black hat hackers,” are only a subset of the larger group of hackers—in fact, a 
tiny proportion, only about 1%.180 Hackers tend to have different motivations, 
purposes, and incentives, ranging from seeking a thrill or challenge, or resolving 
and fixing vulnerabilities, to extorting a user, disrupting the functioning of 
computers and networks, stealing data and credentials, and potentially selling 
the data or vulnerabilities in a designated marketplace on the Internet.181
Similarly, people tinker with their devices for a variety of reasons—for fun, 
to study, or to fix vulnerabilities and weaknesses, but also for criminal and 
destructive purposes.182 More importantly, hackers have a clear advantage over 
vendors when it comes to finding vulnerabilities.183 While a vendor may be 
focused on other tasks, hackers can dedicate their time to further study a specific 
system and identify its flaws.184 Hackers also tend to have the cutting-edge 
knowledge that allows them to reveal vulnerabilities in creative ways.185
Considering that it is far easier to attack than to defend in cyberspace—the 
attacker needs to know of only one vulnerability, while the defender has to 
defend against all possible attacks—provides yet another argument in favor of 
ethical hacking for security purposes.186 Efficient cyber-defense strategies, 
therefore, have to rely on a robust cybersecurity research environment, which 
involves hacking.187
This Part will explain the three main categories of hackers, which may assist 
in the further analysis of the “freedom to hack.” These categories are typically 
assigned a color—white, gray, or black. These colors reflect the morality of the 
                                                                                                                     
178 See York, supra note 25.
179 See Cassandra Kirsch, The Grey Hat Hacker: Reconciling Cyberspace Reality and 
the Law, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 383, 385 (2014) (explaining that “not all hacking is created 
equal”).
180 See Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software 
Security, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 296 (2006).
181 See id. at 294–98.
182 See Samuelson, supra note 13, at 564. 
183 See Bambauer & Day, supra note 20, at 1062. 
184 Id. at 1061.
185 Id.
186 See LILLIAN ABLON ET AL., MARKETS FOR CYBERCRIME TOOLS AND STOLEN DATA:
HACKERS’ BAZAAR 31 (2014).
187 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 27, at 786.
2019] FREEDOM TO HACK 481
hacking—which may also suggest its legality, though the two are not mutually 
dependent.188 As this Part demonstrates, the boundary between legitimate and 
illegitimate hacking is somewhat fuzzy,189 given that both ethical and criminal 
hackers are utilizing the same techniques, and at first blush, in the absence of 
context, it is hard to differentiate between the two.190 Law enforcement and 
courts are not always well-equipped to make this normative determination,191
and this Article therefore argues that differentiating between ethical and 
unethical hackers depends on whether the hacker in question exploited a 
vulnerability and whether procedures of vulnerability disclosure were followed. 
This will be further discussed in Part IV. 
A. White Hat
White-hat hackers are security researchers whose main motivation is to 
improve software and hardware by revealing vulnerabilities and security flaws 
and disclosing them in a way that will ensure they are patched.192 White-hat 
hackers, when not employed by the vendors themselves, are motivated only 
sometimes by financial gain (the expectation of being monetarily rewarded);193
more often they are motivated by the challenge, or by the genuine belief that 
improving the quality of software and hardware will make Internet security 
stronger.194
For an illustration of how white hats are improving the security of the 
broader Internet infrastructure, look to Mike Lynn, a security researcher then 
affiliated with Internet Security Systems, who discovered a serious software 
flaw in Cisco’s routers.195 Although Lynn reported the vulnerability to Cisco, 
he was still threatened with legal action because he planned on presenting some 
of the information to his peers at a security conference.196 The gravity of this 
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flaw was characterized then as a ticking bomb endangering the very backbone 
of the Internet.197
Certain commentators believe that the notion of separating white hats from 
other hackers is that white hats act under authorization.198 Another distinction 
made in literature is based on disclosure: hackers disclosing vulnerabilities 
directly to the vendor are white hats, while those publicizing vulnerabilities to 
the broader public are considered gray hats.199
Given that white hats’ motivation is primarily the drive to enhance security, 
it seems unreasonable to subject these individuals to legal liability, assuming 
that cybersecurity is in the interest of the broader public and possibly the 
international community. It would be best, therefore, to define white hats as 
hackers who seek to improve security while minimizing possible harm to the 
vulnerable target by neither exploiting the vulnerability nor selling it to 
malicious actors.200
B. Black Hat
Black-hat hacking is the exact opposite of the white-hat approach. Indeed, 
black hats are hackers motivated by mischief or profit rather than by actually 
fixing vulnerabilities and security flaws.201 The ability to anonymize one’s
identity on the Internet allows for the proliferation of black hat hackers (or 
“cybercriminals”), which lowers the risks of detection and prosecution 
compared to the physical world.202 Data suggests that law enforcement is 
usually reluctant to investigate, apprehend, and prosecute cybercriminals, given 
that hackers often reside overseas, which presents challenges with regard to 
jurisdiction and gathering evidence.203
Certain commentators make the argument that, even though black hats are 
essentially cybercriminals, the law should still allow them to operate freely since 
they can expose flaws and vulnerabilities that could have been exploited in more 
harmful ways, such as through terrorism or state-sponsored attacks.204 However, 
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the analysis in this Article will exclude black-hat hackers, since their primary 
intention is not enhancing security.
C. Gray Hat
Hackers’ ethics and motivations are not binary but rather could be placed 
somewhere on a black-white continuum. The gray area in which hackers operate 
with unclear motivations is fittingly labeled as “gray hat.”205 As an example, 
gray hats will still identify vulnerabilities, but, rather than disclosing them to the 
vendor, they might sell them to governments, intelligence agencies, or law 
enforcement authorities.206 The buyer, in turn, uses the vulnerability for a 
variety of purposes, such as for espionage, military, or law enforcement ends.207
The primary intention of gray hats is not necessarily enhancing security, 
although that could be one motivation—it is the desire to monetize 
vulnerabilities by selling them to official entities other than the vendor.208 It is 
difficult to tell whether gray hats are included or excluded from the scope of the 
argument in this Article, since that largely depends on their motivations and the 
precise nature of their activities. But assuming the gray-hat hacker in question 
follows the procedure of vulnerability disclosure and minimization of harm to 
third parties, they ought to be in the clear in terms of legal liability.
D. The Vulnerability Market
When considering a freedom to hack, it is also important to understand the 
incentives and realities of the “black-hat” vulnerability market.209 In this 
market, hackers sell what are typically known as “zero-day exploits,” meaning 
that vendors are unaware of these vulnerabilities in their systems and, therefore,
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the chance of them getting patched is relatively low.210 Governments, 
intelligence agencies, militaries, and cybercriminals find this black market for 
vulnerabilities very appealing,211 and hackers who end up selling vulnerabilities 
on that market believe that they are better off doing so rather than disclosing 
them to the respective vendor.212
In the digital era, knowing of a vulnerability can be either a weapon or a 
shield. Legalizing ethical hacking could be an incentive to use that knowledge 
as a shield while reducing the likelihood that researchers will sell vulnerabilities 
on the black market. In many respects, the legal challenges demonstrated in Part
III of this Article create an incentive for researchers to sell vulnerabilities on the 
black market, rather than to disclose them to the relevant parties, for fear of legal 
jeopardy.213 The result makes individual users less safe and creates a serious 
danger to the Internet as a whole, considering that critical infrastructure and 
other public services may be running software with exploitable vulnerabilities 
of which the vendor has no knowledge.214
At the same time, there are white-hat vulnerability markets, which are often 
referred to as “bug bounty” programs, facilitated by the vendors themselves.215
These markets create incentives for security researchers by offering monetary 
rewards for reports of vulnerabilities made directly to the vendors under 
predetermined conditions.216 Their purpose is to create a greater incentive for 
security researchers to cooperate with vendors in order to prevent vulnerabilities 
from being sold to potentially malicious actors—criminal hackers and hostile 
governments.217
E. Accountability in the IoT Industry
Allowing ethical hackers to freely snoop for vulnerabilities and flaws could 
facilitate a more accountable IoT industry: manufacturers will patch reported 
vulnerabilities and attempt to improve their products in a way that provides 
reasonable security, and therefore data privacy, in order to avoid negative 
publicity. The ethical hacking community is usually ahead of regulatory efforts 
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to set standards for industries, which potentially allows for a more efficient and 
informed security atmosphere. 
Regulatory agencies are slowly beginning to realize the immense potential 
of exposing IoT vulnerabilities with the help of the hacker community. This 
allows the industry to patch vulnerabilities before malicious actors can exploit 
them for criminal, political, or challenge-driven ends. The FTC has recently 
announced an IoT challenge to “combat security vulnerabilities in home 
devices,”218 offering a monetary reward for a tool that would enhance IoT 
security in the form of a “physical device that the consumer can add to his or 
her home network that would check and install updates for other IoT devices on 
that home network, or it might be an app or cloud-based service, or a dashboard 
or other user interface.”219 However, this effort is still not actively encouraging 
ethical hacking; rather, it encourages innovation. At the same time, the FTC has 
also become an enforcer of cybersecurity and privacy, under Section 5(a) of the 
FTC Act.220 In the future, the FTC may play an active part in ensuring that 
vendors address vulnerabilities reported to them in a reasonable and timely 
manner.
IV. THE FREEDOM TO HACK
Individuals tinker with their devices for many reasons, including for the 
challenge, to learn how the system works, or for diagnostic and repair 
purposes.221 The freedom to tinker is important for innovation and creativity, 
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and, as the next Parts will analyze, for the enhancement of security. Ensuring 
more ownership rights to consumers of otherwise copyrighted objects is not only 
a legalistic concept but an actual advocacy movement. For example, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a nonprofit organization, is a strong 
proponent of a broad right to tinker, giving consumers more flexibility and 
autonomy and protecting “civil liberties in the digital world.”222 The ideology 
behind the movement is the belief that technology helps protect civil rights and 
liberties like freedom of expression, privacy, and activism.223
Edward Felten notes that tinkering is not only a natural part of property 
rights, which the owner possesses, but an exercise in defining the relationship 
between the user and digital devices as “our experience is mediated through 
these devices.”224 Although tinkering is seemingly intuitively part of ownership, 
it has largely not been formally legally recognized.225 When the law has 
addressed tinkering, it has mostly been framed under the “permission culture,”
which permits tinkering only under very limited and narrow circumstances.226
Any deviation from this has generally been considered a prohibited criminal 
activity.227
Court cases on the freedom to tinker reach as far as the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which, in the recent Impression Products v. Lexmark International, allowed 
consumers to tinker with and reuse their printer cartridges without facing patent 
infringement charges, highlighting that this freedom is part of “the rights that 
come along with ownership”228 and that “the buyer is free and clear of an 
infringement lawsuit” in such circumstances.229
Many have been advocating for a broad freedom to tinker with otherwise 
copyright-protected hardware and software.230 The EFF and other non-profit 
organizations have long pushed for a right to tinker with rightfully owned 
hardware and software, framing it as a broader “digital freedom.”231 In the past, 
consumers could reverse-engineer and research their devices, but nowadays, 
Section 1201 of the DMCA, which prohibits circumvention of Technical 
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Protection Measures (TPMs), as well as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA) and wiretap laws have hampered that ability.232 Similarly, there is a 
growing body of research suggesting that companies create contractual “safe 
harbors” for security researchers, meaning that contracts ought to foster security 
research rather than stifle it.233
The freedom to tinker encompasses many dimensions—it allows for the 
intellectual freedom to learn more about different objects in people’s lives.234
This Article introduces a subset of the freedom to tinker—the freedom to hack.
By freedom to hack, I mean that the law, along with the institutions that 
interpret, apply, and enforce it, should recognize the benefits of security 
research (or ethical hacking). The old saying goes “given enough eyeballs, all 
bugs are shallow,”235 indeed it is increasingly becoming the new tech wisdom—
inviting the security research community to participate in this information 
security enhancing activity. Empirical evidence suggests that bug bounty 
programs are in fact a cost-effective mechanism.236 This mostly includes 
research into vulnerabilities in software, hardware, and networks with the intent 
of fixing these flaws and making the system less susceptible to malicious 
hacking and more secure overall. Therefore, to some extent, security researchers 
or hacking-savvy individuals should be able to hack and snoop for 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses in order to make computer systems and networks 
stronger by exposing these flaws. There is an ongoing debate over how to 
disclose vulnerabilities and software flaws, and I will discuss it further in Part 
IV of this Article. 
The freedom to hack, only a small part of the freedom to tinker, focuses on 
one important dimension—the right to expose and disclose vulnerabilities to the 
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vendor without being subjected to civil or criminal penalties. This does not 
entail an unrestricted right to hack. The law will still have to restrict hacking 
that causes serious harm to third parties (such as privacy violations), which 
should be treated under a criminal liability regime237 or tort law.238 Rather, there 
should be an intellectual freedom to use methods of hacking to fix and improve 
software and hardware, with a robust distinction between constructive and 
destructive (i.e., exploitative) hacking.239
Many tech companies, and even governmental authorities, actively 
encourage ethical hacking of their systems and provide what are referred to as 
“bug bounties,” through which they invite hackers to test their systems for 
vulnerabilities and to report any possible flaws in exchange for monetary 
compensation.240 However, there are still certain boundaries imposed by bug 
bounty programs in terms of what activities are allowed and prohibited.241 Even 
when no compensation is guaranteed, or no official bug bounty program is in 
place,242 many individual security researchers still engage in bug hunting for a 
variety of reasons.243 This leads to some serious tensions. Not all tech 
companies encourage an active hunt for bugs in their software, and some would 
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even be quite unwelcoming of any vulnerabilities reported, whether due to 
reputational or cost-associated reasons,244 and might claim such vulnerability 
collection to be in breach of contract or in violation of the law.245
With regard to possible circumvention liability, DMCA prohibits 
circumvention of TPMs in copyrighted software, thus possibly exposing 
security researchers to liability.246 At the same time, with regard to criminal 
liability, the CFAA contains a fair number of ambiguous concepts in relation to 
hacking — or unauthorized access—that, if interpreted in a certain light, could 
expose legitimate security researchers to legal jeopardy.247 The DMCA, CFAA, 
and contractual hurdles will be further discussed in the following two subparts.
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
Computer software, just like any other creative work, is protected under 
copyright law.248 In 1998, Congress enacted the DMCA, creating a legal barrier 
for tinkerers.249 The DMCA implemented the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) treaties by creating a legal regime against circumvention 
of TPMs,250 protecting copyrighted works through the criminalization of 
circumvention of these measures.251
Subsection 1201(a)(1)(A) of the U.S.C. reads, “No person shall circumvent 
a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected 
under this title.”252 In this way, Section 1201 restricts legitimate users from 
controlling their devices, since the IoT environment is ultimately a collection of 
devices running on copyrighted software often protected by TPMs. This would 
mean that smart vehicles, pacemakers, insulin pumps, thermostats, and any 
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other IoT devices are covered by the Section on anti-circumvention, unless an 
explicit exemption is provided by the DMCA, as discussed below. 
Realizing that an absolute exclusion of the right to tinker is unreasonable 
with respect to digital works, the DMCA also provides certain exemptions from 
infringement liability, which will be discussed in the following sections. 
Initially, however, the DMCA provided a very narrow exemption from 
copyright infringement for reverse-engineering of software for the purposes of 
interoperability,253 encryption research,254 and security testing.255
In addition to the DMCA, users often agree to certain “terms of service,”256
which create a contractual obligation vis-à-vis the software or hardware vendor, 
creating another hurdle for users and, therefore, security researchers.257 This 
private ordering restricts security researchers because it grants vendors legal 
tools to stifle security research, or any sort of tinkering with their products, 
purely for business reasons, trumping any security concerns.258
In 2002, for example, HP was allegedly the first company to use the DMCA 
as a weapon against security researchers.259 HP threatened to file a lawsuit 
against software security company SnoSoft, which had identified a security flaw 
in HP’s Tru64 operating system.260 HP threatened the researchers by noting that 
they “could be fined up to $500,000 and imprisoned for up to five years” under 
the DMCA.261 Eventually, HP had to back down from this threat, due to public 
                                                                                                                     
253 Id. § 1201(f)(1) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person 
who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a particular portion of that program 
for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are 
necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program with 
other programs, and that have not previously been readily available to the person engaging 
in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of identification and analysis do not 
constitute infringement under this title.”).
254 Id. § 1201(g)(2) (“[I]it is not a violation of that subsection for a person to circumvent 
a technological measure as applied to a copy, phonorecord, performance, or display of a 
published work in the course of an act of good faith encryption research.”).
255 See id. § 1201(j) (“[It] is not a violation of that subsection for a person to engage in 
an act of security testing.” However, this exemption differs from the newly adopted security 
research exemption, since it required “authorization from the owner or operator” of the 
computer that was accessed.).
256 The government has previously argued that violating Terms of Service ought to be 
considered a violation of the CFAA, since it is construed as “unauthorized access.” See 
United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
257 UC BERKELEY SCH. OF INFO., supra note 44, at 8–9.
258 See id.
259 Declan McCullagh, Security Warning Draws DMCA Threat, CNET (Aug. 1, 2012), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/security-warning-draws-dmca-threat [https://perma.cc/SV6D-
WZ2R].
260 Id. 
261 Id.
2019] FREEDOM TO HACK 491
scrutiny.262 Since then, the DMCA has been used against academic researchers, 
such as when the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) 
threatened Professor Edward Felten.263 Felten’s paper dealt with breaking the 
Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI)’s systems and incited the RIAA to 
demand that Felten withdraw his paper from a conference.264 Felten ultimately 
did so.265 Felten is just one example of many researchers who, after disclosing 
vulnerabilities, receive cease-and-desist letters from companies with threats of 
legal action and explicit demands to discontinue any further security research 
due to the alleged illegality of the act.266
1. The DMCA Exemption for Security Research
A lot has been said about the unclear relationship between intellectual 
property and security research, primarily how the DMCA is an ill-suited 
framework for authorizing security research.267 Copyright (or the right to 
exclude tinkerers) is not an absolute legal concept, and certain interests, such as 
security and privacy, should prevail when balanced against the need to protect 
the rights of copyright owners.268 Therefore, the Library of Congress (LoC) has 
a routine procedure—the triennial review—to assess whether certain 
exemptions from copyright (and criminal) liability are required in order to 
ensure that other important interests are fulfilled.269 Before discussing the 
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specific exemption within the DMCA relevant to IoT, it is essential to 
understand the triennial process, as well as how the world of copyright slowly 
creeps into other territories, such as information security.
The DMCA created a procedure of triennial review so that potential 
exemptions to the DMCA could be proposed by the broader public.270 Parties 
can claim that they are adversely affected by the DMCA’s anti-circumvention 
rule, and, after public hearing and comment, the Registrar of Copyrights submits 
recommendations to the Librarian of Congress, who then determines whether to 
approve the proposed exemptions to the rule.271 For example, the Librarian has 
to assess, among other things, “the impact that the prohibition on the 
circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has on 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research”272 and 
“such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.”273 In other words, 
the DMCA does not directly prescribe security as part of what the Librarian has 
to consider when recognizing new exemptions, but it gives the Librarian broad 
discretion.
In 2016, the LoC authorized an exemption that was no less than a 
breakthrough for the computer security community.274 In 2018, the LoC 
renewed and expanded the security exemption, and the current version of the 
exemption reads as follows: 
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recognized that it could not predict the future technology landscape, and therefore, included 
the rulemaking process in the statutory scheme to create flexibility.”). 
270 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2012) (“[T]he Librarian of Congress, upon the 
recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, who shall consult with the Assistant 
Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce and report 
and comment on his or her views in making such recommendation, shall make the 
determination in a rulemaking proceeding for purposes of subparagraph (B) of whether 
persons who are users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year 
period, adversely affected by the prohibition under subparagraph (A) in their ability to make 
noninfringing uses under this title of a particular class of copyrighted works. In conducting 
such rulemaking, the Librarian shall examine: (i) the availability for use of copyrighted 
works; (ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and 
educational purposes; (iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of 
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measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works; and (v) such other factors as the 
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271 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
272 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(iii).
273 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(v).
274 Jack Detsch, The Legal Exemption Making Life Easier for Ethical Hackers,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/
Security-culture/2016/1207/The-legal-exemption-making-life-easier-for-ethical-hackers 
[https://perma.cc/2DCD-FQQR]. 
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The prohibition against circumvention of technological measures that 
effectively control access to copyrighted works set forth in 17 U.S.C. 
1201(a)(1)(A) shall not apply to persons who engage in noninfringing uses of 
the following classes of copyrighted works: . . . (10) Computer programs that 
are contained in and control the functioning of a lawfully acquired smartphone 
or home appliance or home system, such as a refrigerator, thermostat, HVAC, 
or electrical system, when circumvention is a necessary step to allow the 
diagnosis, maintenance, or repair of such a device or system, and is not 
accomplished for the purpose of gaining access to other copyrighted works. … 
(11)(i) Computer programs, where the circumvention is undertaken on a
lawfully acquired device or machine on which the computer program operates, 
or is undertaken on a computer, computer system, or computer network on 
which the computer program operates with the authorization of the owner or 
operator of such computer, computer system, or computer network, solely for 
the purpose of good-faith security research and does not violate any applicable 
law, including without limitation the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.
(ii) For purposes of this paragraph (b)(11), “good-faith security research”
means accessing a computer program solely for purposes of good-faith testing, 
investigation, and/or correction of a security flaw or vulnerability, where such 
activity is carried out in an environment designed to avoid any harm to 
individuals or the public, and where the information derived from the activity 
is used primarily to promote the security or safety of the class of devices or 
machines on which the computer program operates, or those who use such 
devices or machines, and is not used or maintained in a manner that facilitates 
copyright infringement.275
In the 2015 exemption, which was renewed in 2018, the LoC had explicitly 
recognized two sub-categories of devices covered by the exemption: motorized 
land vehicles and medical devices.276 These two sub-categories were there for a 
reason. Any flaws and vulnerabilities in these two types of devices could 
potentially be deadly or at least pose a serious danger to the safety of their 
users.277 Medical devices, including insulin pumps, pacemakers, implantable 
                                                                                                                     
275 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(10)–-(11) (2018). Maintenance is defined as “the servicing of 
the device or system in order to make it work in accordance with its original specifications 
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defined as “the restoring of the device or system to the state of working in accordance with 
its original specifications and any changes to those specifications authorized for that device 
or system.” Id. § 201.40(b)(10)(i)–(ii).
276 Id. § 201.40(b)(7) & (9).
277 The FDA in its premarket cybersecurity guidelines for medical devices categorizes 
five types of risks: negligible (inconvenience or temporary discomfort); minor (results in 
temporary injury or impairment not requiring professional medical intervention); serious 
(results in injury or impairment requiring professional medical intervention); critical (results 
in permanent impairment or life-threatening injury); and catastrophic (results in patient 
death). FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR MANAGEMENT 
OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION STAFF 17 (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm482022.pdf [https://perma.cc/J
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cardioverter defibrillators, and glucose monitors, are prone to software flaws, 
posing an actual and immediate danger to the patients using them.278 Only 
recently the FDA reported that certain implantable cardiac devices are 
vulnerable to attacks, which could allow an unauthorized user to control the 
device and exfiltrate data from it.279 Surprisingly, medical devices are ridden 
with vulnerabilities; as already reported, certain insulin pumps280 and 
pacemakers281 are vulnerable to hacking. 
Motorized land vehicles are increasingly computerized and connected to the 
Internet, creating a whole host of vulnerabilities that may be fatal. The 
automobile industry has yet to realize the many risks associated with such 
development in the architecture of cars.282 In fact, Wired reported that security 
researchers were able to hack into the entertainment-system computer of a Jeep, 
letting hackers command the vehicle — including steering and braking.283 This 
led to Chrysler recalling its 1.4 million vulnerable vehicles in order to patch the 
bug.284 The fact that smart vehicles often have more than a hundred million lines 
of code strengthens the notion that security research is essential for vehicles.285
There are a few shortcomings to the 2018 DMCA security exemption that 
could further stifle certain types of security research. While the exemption does 
give significant leeway to security researchers who circumvent the software of 
a “smartphone or home appliance or home system” for “diagnosis, maintenance, 
                                                                                                                     
2FB-7YEG] [hereinafter FDA CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS].
278 Jay G. Ronquillo & Diana M. Zuckerman, Software-Related Recalls of Health 
Information Technology and Other Medical Devices: Implications for FDA Regulation of 
Digital Health, 95 MILBANK Q. 535, 550 (2017); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, RECOMMENDATIONS ON SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING: SIXTH 
TRIENNIAL PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON 
CIRCUMVENTION 378 (Oct. 8, 2015) https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/registers-
recommendation.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6ZE-EA92] [hereinafter SECTION 1201 REGISTER 
OF COPYRIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS].
279 Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Identified in St. Jude Medical’s Implantable Cardiac 
Devices and Merlin@home Transmitter: FDA Safety Communication, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm5
35843.htm [https://perma.cc/34EZ-WN8P].
280 Jim Finkle, J&J Warns Diabetic Patients: Insulin Pumps Vulnerable to Hacking,
REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-cyber-insulin-
pumps-e-idUSKCN12411L [https://perma.cc/J2PQ-SYH2].
281 Khandelwal, supra note 164.
282 UC BERKELEY SCH. OF INFO., supra note 44, at 3.
283 Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It,
WIRED (July 21, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-
highway [https://perma.cc/MB5K-857M].
284 Andy Greenberg, After Jeep Hack, Chrysler Recalls 1.4M Vehicles for Bug Fix,
WIRED (July 24, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/jeep-hack-chrysler-recalls-1-4m-
vehicles-bug-fix [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=3991-44255-44257-52811].
285 David Zax, Many Cars Have a Hundred Million Lines of Code, M.I.T. TECH. REV.
(Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/508231/many-cars-have-a-hundred-
million-lines-of-code [https://perma.cc/58AK-MZGK].
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or repair” of such devices,286 it excludes a considerable subgroup of IoT 
devices—those that are not used by individual consumers, such as those used 
by the government or by other organizations.287
Notwithstanding, the comments submitted in connection with the next 
triennial rulemaking process suggest that some conceptual shift could take place 
with regard to the DMCA security research exemption. For example, the 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section at the Department of Justice 
recently filed comments with the Library of Congress, in which it expressed its 
willingness to eliminate the ambiguousness of the language contained within 
the exemption.288 This includes broadening the scope and classes of devices that 
may be researched (beyond devices for individual use), elimination of controlled 
environment as a prerequisite for legitimate research, and clarification of what 
it means to “lawfully acquire” a device on which security research takes 
place.289 Indeed, in 2018, the exemption removed the requirement of lawfully 
acquiring a device as a prerequisite for good-faith security research, and 
changed that to “authorization of the owner or operator” which does not require 
ownership, but is rather based on the owner’s consent.290
a. Good Faith
The DMCA exemption is conditioned upon “good faith,”291 which is tricky 
to define in the context of security research, particularly on behalf of unaffiliated 
hackers.292 The exemption provides that “good-faith security research” means: 
[A]ccessing a computer program solely for purposes of good-faith testing, 
investigation, and/or correction of a security flaw or vulnerability, where such 
activity is carried out in an environment designed to avoid any harm to 
individuals or the public, and where the information derived from the activity 
is used primarily to promote the security or safety of the class of devices or 
machines on which the computer program operates, or those who use such 
                                                                                                                     
286 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(10) (2018).
287 See Erik Stallman, A Qualified Win for Cybersecurity Researchers in DMCA 
Triennial Rulemaking, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Oct. 27, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog
/a-qualified-win-for-cybersecurity-researchers-in-dmca-triennial-rulemaking/ 
[https://perma.cc/C875-WALA] (arguing that devices “primarily designed for the use by 
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288 See Letter from John T. Lynch, supra note 267.
289 Id.
290 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(11)(i) (2018). 
291 See id. § 201.40(b)(11)(i).
292 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., THE CYBER: HARD QUESTIONS IN THE WORLD OF 
COMPUTER RESEARCH 12, 21 (Mar. 2017), https://cdt.org/files/2017/03/2017-03-23-
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devices or machines, and is not used or maintained in a manner that facilitates 
copyright infringement.293
This requirement limits the security research exemption to circumvention 
efforts intended for testing, investigation, and correction of vulnerabilities and 
flaws.294 It also requires an environment that is appropriate to the potential 
harms that could arise from such activity, with the purpose of avoiding them.295
The information obtained through the security research should be used primarily 
to promote security.296
These requirements implicate security research in several ways. First, they 
exclude security researchers who happen to stumble upon a vulnerability or who 
identify a possible fix to a flaw without intending to do so (i.e., not in an 
appropriate environment). Recently, an “accidental hero” offered a kill-switch 
to the global ransomware “WannaCry,” but according to him finding a solution 
to WannaCry had not been his intention initially.297 This could stifle 
vulnerability reporting by researchers whose intentions at the outset are not to 
promote security. 
Second, the DMCA does not define “environment,” therefore potentially 
excluding security researchers whose environments would not be considered 
“designed to avoid any harm” and possibly allowing vendors to abuse this
requirement against unaffiliated security researchers.298 The introduction of 
cloud computing as a central part of the IoT ecosystem is another exacerbating 
factor to the notion of “environment.”299 In fact, some opposition to the 
“environment” standard has been raised by the DOJ itself, noting that 
“[a]lthough such a tightly-controlled environment might be necessary for certain 
types of research that present especially serious risks of harm, isolated lab-like 
settings are not required in every instance of security research.”300
                                                                                                                     
293 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(11)(ii) (2018); see 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(1) (2012).
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297 Nadia Khomami & Olivia Solon, ‘Accidental Hero’ Halts Ransomware Attack and 
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cyber-attack [https://perma.cc/L9P8-8RKX].
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https://www.techspot.com/news/77172-extensions-dmca-exemptions-allow-security-
researchers-continue-doing.html [https://perma.cc/3S2B-7ZZ3] (explaining that new 
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299 See Bambauer & Day, supra note 20, at 1091–92 (explaining how cloud computing 
complicates researchers’ ability to test their own security).
300 Letter from John T. Lynch, supra note 289, at 4.
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Third, the exemption provides that information gathered from exempted 
security research should be used “primarily” to enhance security and safety.301
However, this potentially opens the door to security research that crosses from 
a white- or gray-hat world into black-hat territory, where motivations are usually 
malicious.302
Lastly, these requirements provide a glimpse into the phenomenon of 
copyright bleeding over into cybersecurity,303 meaning that the requirement is 
not necessarily in line with the way ethical hackers actually operate in the 
vulnerability detection space.304 This is more of an institutional problem, in 
which the question is whether the organs involved in the DMCA triennial review 
process are actually well-equipped to address the security issues within their 
purview.
b. Opposition by U.S. Regulatory Agencies
Agencies that commented on the proposed exemption during the triennial 
review process had several reservations. While the National 
Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) supported the 
aforementioned exemption to the prohibition on circumvention,305 other
agencies, such as the FDA, DOT, and EPA, strongly opposed and had 
significant reservations to exempting computer programs for good-faith security 
research.306 The main thrust of these agencies’ argument is that security research 
into computer programs could actually compromise security and privacy.307 As 
certain opponents noted, “‘fixing’ of medical devices without FDA or 
manufacturer permission would risk patient safety because it would ‘enable 
others to bypass proper regulatory controls.’”308
                                                                                                                     
301 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(1).
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307 See id., at 313–15.
308 Id. at 293.
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The FDA, for example, opposed the exemption because every medical 
device has to undergo FDA premarket approval,309 and unrestricted meddling 
with or changes to software in medical devices would put patients “at increased 
risk from bad faith attempts to modify devices during the period required to 
develop and obtain [FDA] approval for the change.”310 As a result, the FDA, 
the agency responsible for the safety and privacy of medical devices, would not 
be able to support any exemption that would compromise that responsibility.311
FDA guidance in Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity 
in Medical Devices contains certain suggestions for vendors of medical devices, 
such as limiting access to trusted users, ensuring trusted content, and planning 
for detection, response, and recovery from security compromises.312 However, 
this guidance is only a recommendation for effective cybersecurity 
management. Though vendors submitting medical devices for FDA premarket 
review will want to implement these recommendations to ensure FDA approval, 
they are by no means legally binding.313 This demonstrates that even the 
seemingly strictest agency in terms of IoT security provides only recommended 
guidelines to vendors, highlighting the need for external security research due 
to the increasing volume of vulnerabilities.314
B. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 
Federal and state statutes have outlawed unauthorized access to 
computers.315 While each state statute is slightly different, they all share some 
basic concepts.316 The CFAA of 1984 criminalizes certain potentially harmful 
computer-related activities.317 Since its enactment, the CFAA has been 
amended ten times, and each time its scope has been expanded.318 The CFAA 
is often said to be “one of the most far-reaching criminal laws in the United
                                                                                                                     
309 See generally FDA CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 277
(describing recommended premarket steps related to cybersecurity). 
310 SECTION 1201 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 278, at 
293. 
311 See id., at 314–15.
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313 See id. at 2.
314 See Medical Devices, Digital Health: Cybersecurity, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 
19, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/digitalhealth/ucm373213.htm
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States Code” due to its broad language and enforcement.319 This vagueness 
raises constitutionality questions, particularly in the context of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine,320 exerting “pressure on courts to adopt narrow 
interpretations of access and authorization.”321 The statute was inspired by the 
common-law trespass doctrine, which does not always fit perfectly with the 
realities of the Internet.322 The central provision applicable to security research 
is located in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), which deals with unauthorized access to 
protected computers and criminalizes the obtaining of “information from any 
protected computer”323 through intentional access to “a computer without 
authorization” or exceeding “authorized access.”324 The concepts of “access”
and “authorization” have been the subject of substantial debate.325 This has led 
to confusion among computer users, security researchers, and even law 
enforcement.326 Experts admit that this provision has the lowest thresholds and 
is therefore applicable to a broad subset of online activities.327 It would be 
outside the scope of this Article to reiterate the debate over the precise contours 
of authorization and access. The focus would be on how security research is 
stifled by the prohibition on unauthorized access.
The scope of unauthorized access largely criminalizes any instance of 
interstate hacking328 and encompasses every Internet-connected device within 
the scope of “protected computer,”329 including anything that has a “microchip 
                                                                                                                     
319 Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN.
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326 See Kirsch, supra note 179, at 392–93 (discussing the resulting confusion due to 
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327 See KERR, COMPUTER, supra note 315, at 78.
328 See Kerr, Vagueness, supra note 319, at 1567 (“The 1996 amendments expanded the 
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329 See id. at 1571.
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or that permits digital storage.”330 The CFAA defines “computer” in a broad 
manner and excludes only a few devices, such as “an automated typewriter or 
typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device.”331 Since 
some security research requires the use of hacking methods, this overbroad 
approach stifles research into vulnerabilities in such critical systems as voting 
machines,332 resulting in adversaries learning about these vulnerabilities before 
the vendor can identify them.333 Even at present, security researchers at the 
renowned DefCon hacking conference managed to hack into several voting 
machines in less than ninety minutes.334 This reveals the need to rebalance the 
goals of criminal law and cybersecurity.
Notwithstanding the overbroad scope of the CFAA, another structural 
problem it presents is the absence of a “legal feedback loop of the exemption 
request process Congress provided in the DMCA.”335 This is a significant 
structural difference, because while the DMCA is amenable to reconsideration 
of its scope through the triennial review procedure, the CFAA is generally not 
as flexible and does not allow for exceptions or defenses that are not explicitly 
provided in the law.336 This structural difference limits the power of the DMCA 
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335 Andrea Matwyshyn, Cyber Harder, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 450, 478 (2018).
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in creating security research exemptions, since these are still subject to the far-
reaching CFAA provisions.337
The overbroadness of computer crime statutes is not a problem in only U.S. 
law; it has also been a matter of concern in security research communities 
overseas.338 For instance, in the United Kingdom, the Computer Misuse Act of 
1990 was recently amended to criminalize the “creation, supply or application 
of ‘hacker tools’ for use in computer misuse offences.”339 This has significantly 
broadened the scope of application of the Act, making ethical hackers concerned 
about potential legal jeopardy.340
The threat posed to security researchers by the CFAA is far from theoretical. 
In 2002, Bret McDanel, an employee of Tornado Development, Inc., was 
convicted and sentenced to sixteen months in federal prison for disclosing a 
serious vulnerability in the online-messaging product offered by his 
employer.341 At first, McDanel reported the vulnerability to his employer, but 
the employer never patched it.342 As a last resort, McDanel e-mailed as many as 
5,600 Tornado customers to inform them of the unpatched vulnerability.343 As 
a result, the Department of Justice indicted McDanel, arguing that his actions 
knowingly caused “the transmission of a program, information, code, or 
command, and[,] as a result of such conduct, intentionally cause[d] damage 
without authorization[] to a protected computer.”344
The DOJ has since admitted that prosecuting McDanel was a mistake; it 
filed a motion to reverse the conviction in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
noting that his actions had not indicated an intent to harm his employer and 
could have potentially pressured his employer to fix the vulnerability, thus
protecting the privacy of customers using the messaging product.345 The 
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338 See QIANYUN WANG, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CYBERCRIME IN CRIMINAL LAW:
CHINA, U.S., ENGLAND, SINGAPORE AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 77 (2016).
339 STEFAN FAFINSKI, COMPUTER MISUSE: RESPONSES, REGULATION AND THE LAW 76
(2009). 
340 A testimony by UK-based technician read, “That’s the end of penetration testing. 
Why would I risk ending up in jail for doing my job? It’s madness. It takes away the incentive 
for making systems secure and plays right into the hands of criminals.” Id.
341 See Freeman, supra note 36, at 129 (outlining McDanel’s discovery and subsequent 
prosecution). 
342 See id.
343 See id. 
344 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(A).
345 See Government’s Motion for Reversal of Conviction at 6, United States v. Bret 
McDanel, C.A. No. 03-50135 (9th Cir. Oct. 14, 2003) (“[T]he government believes it was 
an error to argue that defendant intended an “impairment” to the integrity of Tornado’s
computer system . . . [i]nstead, the evidence established that defendant informed Tornado’s
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relationship between intent and harm is a critical one, since it could exclude 
security researchers from the scope of the CFAA if unauthorized access can be 
shown to lack intent to cause harm.346 Since the CFAA does not require a 
showing of scienter in relation to the harm, it “overcriminalizes hacking activity 
that involves mere access and inadvertent minor damage”347 and “effectively 
establishes strict liability beyond the intentional access . . . regardless of moral 
culpability.”348
However, it is not only hacking that is criminalized; access to portions of 
the Web that the owner did not design for public access is also generally deemed 
illegal.349 These were the facts in United States v. Auernheimer, where the 
defendant, Andrew Auernheimer, was charged under the CFAA for 
“unauthorized access” because he revealed an AT&T-owned URL that 
contained private account data belonging to as many as 100,000 iPad users.350
Such an approach to the concept of unauthorized access puts security 
researchers at risk not only for using hacking techniques but also for pursuing 
benign activities online that the vendor or owner deems unfriendly.351 This leads 
to “authorization,” a legal term of art within the CFAA, being de facto defined 
by tech companies rather than by Congress, courts, or law enforcement 
authorities.352 This problematic breadth is paired with outdated notions of 
sentencing, discussed in the following subpart.
                                                                                                                     
customers -- the people whose data may have been vulnerable to unauthorized access -- about 
the vulnerability, an action that could have brought about repair of the problem.”). Similarly, 
in United States v. Morris, Morris argued that he had no intent to cause damage when he 
created the Morris worm, although he did have intent to access a protected computer in an 
unauthorized manner (the double scienter question) which caused a considerable amount of 
damage to many computers affected by the Morris worm. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 
504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).
346 See Thompson, supra note 16, at 562–63 (analyzing the intent component of §1030). 
347 See id. at 562.
348 See id. at 568.
349 For example, see the story of Aaron Swartz who was prosecuted on multiple charges 
under the CFAA. Swartz accessed AT&T and JSTOR data in what some termed “data 
liberation.” See The Prosecution of Aaron: A Response to Orin Kerr, PUB. DOMAIN (Jan. 18, 
2018), http://www.thepublicdomain.org/2013/01/18/the-prosecution-of-aaron-a-response-
to-orin-kerr/ [https://perma.cc/MJ75-WF2U]; Academics Go to Jail—CFAA Edition,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 9, 2013), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/04/acad
emics-go-to-jail-cfaa-edition.html [https://perma.cc/H5PE-S9EW].
350 See United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-CR-470, 2012 WL 5389142, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 26, 2012), rev’d, 748 F.3d 525 (2014). 
351 See Kirsch, supra note 179, at 397–98.
352 See id. at 399 (pointing out that private entities often define criminal activity under 
the CFAA).
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1. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines can provide insight into how courts 
currently approach punishment for computer crimes.353 The Guidelines provide 
for harsher punishments for property crimes where the criminal act causes great 
economic loss.354 In the context of computer crimes, such a loss includes, 
among other things, “the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage 
assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its 
condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost . . . .”355 This punishment 
model does not take into account beneficial security research, and it ignores the 
far costlier alternative of malicious exploitation of vulnerabilities.356 Losses 
also include the cost of patching a vulnerability, which would have taken place 
even in absence of the crime.357
The Guidelines impose still greater punishment if the target computer 
belonged to critical infrastructure.358 The exploitation of vulnerabilities in 
critical infrastructure computers, such as those intended to manage power and 
gas, transportation, national security, and public health, could result in 
devastating disruption effects.359 At the same time, if critical infrastructure and 
other non-critical computers operate on that same vulnerable software, it would 
be preferable to target the latter from a risk standpoint; however, that is not 
always possible when critical infrastructure computers operate on their own 
software and systems.360 Therefore, the Guidelines should also consider the 
degree of benefit of the act in question, by comparing it to the full potential of 
exploiting the vulnerability, which could be far more devastating than the 
prosecuted crime.361
                                                                                                                     
353 See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (2016) [hereinafter 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (describing recommended sentences for various federal 
crimes, including computer misuse).
354 Id.§ 2B1.1(b)(1).
355 Id.§ 2B1.1(3)(A)(v)(III) (“[R]easonable cost to any victim, including the cost of 
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, 
system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost 
incurred, or other damages incurred because of interruption of service.”).
356 On the lack of instrumentality in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, see Immunizing the 
Internet, supra note 17, at 2453 (“[C]urrent U.S. Sentencing Guidelines do not sufficiently 
take instrumental concerns into account.”).
357 See id. at 2454 (citing Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930, 
935–36 (9th Cir. 2004) (where the court ruled that routine maintenance and updating would 
be assessed as part of the damages)). 
358 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 353, § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A).
359 See Immunizing the Internet, supra note 17, at 2455.
360 See id. at 2455–56 (illustrating the difficulties in addressing the flaw in only the less-
critical system). 
361 See id. at 2455 (“[P]unishments should encourage attacks that fall shortest of their 
full destructive potential, at the very least by taking into account the gap between potential 
and actual damage during sentencing.”).
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C. Contractual Prohibitions
While statutory prohibitions provide for some serious hurdles for security 
researchers, contractual obligations may also contribute to the restrictive 
information security research environment. The contractual perspective of 
security research, coming into play in many bug bounty programs, has only 
recently received serious academic attention.362 Bug bounty programs typically 
represent a contractual relationship between the sponsoring company and the 
security researcher, meaning that both sides are bound by the terms of the 
contract.363 At the same time, due to differences in bargaining power, as well as 
stakes, the contractual language does not always provide for a “safe harbor” for 
security researchers.364
Many bug bounty contracts surveyed by Elazari Bar On suggest that the 
language contained within these agreements does not mention “authorization,”
which is required in order to establish the legality of security research.365 For 
example, the language usually requires that security researchers “comply with 
‘all applicable laws’” which could defeat the purpose of security research and 
expose these individuals to legal jeopardy.366 Some contractual language also 
prohibits reverse engineering, which is a commonly used tool to identify 
security vulnerabilities.367 In general, there is a growing awareness to 
ambiguous contractual language that shifts the risk to security researchers, with 
researchers recommending that safe harbors are incorporated in bug bounty 
guidelines across the board.368
V. CREATING A SECURE HYPERCONNECTED WORLD THROUGH LAW
If law, and the institutions creating, enforcing, and interpreting it, were to 
recognize the benefits of ethical hacking, this could help resolve many 
systematic shortcomings in what experts call the “security theater.”369
First, incentivizing ethical hackers to report vulnerabilities to the vendor 
would decrease the overall number of unpatched vulnerabilities, narrowing 
                                                                                                                     
362 See Elazari Bar On, supra note 233 (manuscript at 3) (describing the increased use 
of “bug bounty” programs).
363 See id. at 7 (explaining contractual nature of “bug bounty” programs).
364 See id. at 12 (noting lack of safe-harbor provisions in many contracts).
365 See id. at 26–27 (pointing out that many contracts do not explicitly exempt hackers 
from liability). 
366 See id. at 26.
367 See id. at 27 (discussing prohibitions on reverse engineering).
368 See Elazari Bar On, supra note 233 (manuscript at 13) (overviewing the current 
difficulties with common “bug bounty” contractual language). 
369 Similarly, Bruce Schneier refers to a related phenomenon as “security theater,” which 
is “security measures that make people feel more secure without doing anything to actually 
improve their security.” Bruce Schneier, Beyond Security Theater, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(Nov. 2009), https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2009/11/beyond_security_thea.html 
[https://perma.cc/MA42-LQNM].
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down the opportunities for adversaries to attack the IoT ecosystem.370 This 
could also pressure the IoT industry to create secure devices, as companies will 
attempt to avoid public shaming based on flaws in their software detected by 
ethical hackers.371 This will by no means prevent malicious hacking entirely; it 
may, however, decrease its likelihood, by increasing the costs associated with 
mounting a cyber-attack and enabling more targeted and efficient law 
enforcement efforts to deal with the most serious offenses.372 This could be 
achieved through clear distinctions between malicious and benevolent actors 
and through certain legislative and administrative adjustments, such as 
clarification of the boundaries of the CFAA and DMCA in relation to security 
research.
Second, there should be consensus on how to disclose vulnerabilities in an 
acceptable manner. At present, the philosophy on disclosure is highly 
fragmented and context-dependent. In The Hacker’s Aegis, Derek Bambauer 
and Oliver Day recommend that security researchers adhere to five rules of 
thumb, in exchange for immunity from civil liability: report the vulnerability to 
the vendor first; do not sell it; test on the researcher’s own system; do not 
weaponized it; and create a trail.373 While these rules are certainly helpful, there 
is still a need to revisit the fundamental disagreement over disclosure practices.
Finally, allowing security researchers to snoop around for vulnerabilities is 
insufficient on its own; important modifications should support efforts to patch 
flaws in software. Such modifications might include requiring that vendors 
embed built-in patchability into IoT devices, using privacy tort law to address 
                                                                                                                     
370 See, e.g., A.J. Dellinger, Hack the DHS: Senate Bill Would Encourage Hackers to 
Help Improve Security of Department of Homeland Security, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 31, 
2017), https://www.ibtimes.com/hack-dhs-senate-bill-would-encourage-hackers-help-
improve-security-department-2546156 [https://perma.cc/SEY4-3LMY] (explaining that part 
of the purpose behind the “Hack the DHS” bill was to encourage ethical hackers to expose 
vulnerabilities).
371 See Immunizing the Internet, supra note 17, at 2450 (“[M]edia coverage, and user 
complaints can prompt vendors to take action” otherwise, “vendors would be more 
complacent.”). 
372 See Joseph Marks, DHS Is Luke on the Bug Bounty Programs Congress Keeps 
Pushing, NEXTGOV (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2018/04/dhs-
lukewarm-bug-bounty-programs-congress-keeps-pushing/147573/ 
[https://perma.cc/AV8B-N9TR] (quoting DHS Secretary as stating a bug bounty program is 
“not a silver bullet”). See generally Kristina Davis, Protecting Against Cyberattacks a 
Constant Battle, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/security
/Protecting-Against-Cyberattacks-a-Constant-Battle.html [https://perma.cc/9P2K-2Z2K] 
(explaining the military and law enforcement efforts to defend against cyber attacks). For an 
example of ethical hackers helping law enforcement in other countries, see Leena Dhankhar, 
Ethical Hackers Help Police Check Rising Cyber Crimes in Gurgaon, HINDUSTAN TIMES
(Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.hindustantimes.com/gurugram/ethical-hackers-help-police-
check-rising-cyber-crimes-in-gurugram/story-U4VcpQIeBRJgj9uWr5qBLK.html 
[https://perma.cc/J29S-LU3N].
373 See Bambauer & Day, supra note 20, at 1088 (laying out five suggested rules for 
hackers). 
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potential externalities associated with security research, tackling vendors who 
employ the “security by obscurity” practice, and empowering the FTC to 
enforce cybersecurity and vulnerability management practices against rogue 
vendors. These modifications are required in order to achieve a truly secure IoT 
ecosystem, one that encourages vendor accountability and cooperation.
A. Distinguishing Malicious from Benign Hackers
The main difficulty with the proposition that security research should not be 
impeded by legal hurdles is that it is somewhat burdensome to draw a clear line 
between benign and malicious activities in cyberspace.374 This difficulty mainly 
arises because hackers use the same tools regardless of their motives.
There are factors, however, that distinguish between malicious and benign 
hackers, though they are highly dependent on the specific case and facts in 
question. It is one thing to discover a vulnerability, and it is quite a different 
thing to exploit that vulnerability to its full disruptive and destructive 
potential.375 The red line here should be focused on weaponization and 
exploitation—whether the hacker simply identified a flaw and reported it 
responsibly to the vendor (ethical hacking), or whether she or he exploited it to 
cause damage (malicious hacking). This is a case-by-case assessment that 
should focus on whether the hacker used tools and techniques that caused 
minimal harm given the specific circumstances.
The central part of this assessment is the nature of the vulnerability. Some 
vulnerabilities allow access to certain protected information; others grant full 
administrator privileges; and some could even result in malfunction or 
destruction of the hacked device. The dividing line is between reasonable tools 
and effects of vulnerability research versus unreasonable techniques that cause 
damage beyond what is required to identify the flaw. 
Weaponization of a vulnerability can indicate that a hacker is motivated not 
by a desire to fix flaws but rather by a wish to monetize or exploit the 
vulnerability in a manner that causes damage to the unsecure computer systems 
and networks and thus violates the law.376 However, weaponizing a 
                                                                                                                     
374 See generally Larisa April Long, Profiling Hackers, SANS INST. INFOSEC READING 
ROOM 6 (Jan. 26, 2012), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/hackers/profiling-
hackers-33864 [https://perma.cc/348P-9QSX] (“While the law is clear concerning hacking, 
the definition gets a bit fuzzy among the general population and even computer professionals. 
Added into this mix are the Gray Hats, or Ethical Hackers, who blur the line between White 
and Black.”).
375 See Paul N. Stockton & Michele Golabek-Goldman, Curbing the Market for Cyber 
Weapons, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 244 (2013) (“As an alternative to engaging in 
‘responsible disclosure,’ a researcher could instead ‘exploit’ or weaponize the 0-day 
vulnerability.”).
376 See 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(A) (2012). For an example of cybercriminals weaponizing 
vulnerabilities for money, see Thomas Brewster, Russian Cybercriminals Are Loving Those 
Leaked NSA Windows Weapons, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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vulnerability (creating a mechanism to exploit the vulnerability) requires a 
tremendous amount of time and resources, and such a substantial activity would 
make it easier for law enforcement to determine whether the act in question is 
malicious or benign, since the effort of weaponizing is not trivial.377
Supplementing factors include whether hackers cooperate with law 
enforcement (if it comes to that), whether they disclose their actions and 
findings to the vendor, and whether they provide as much information as 
possible to relevant agencies, if needed—for example, reporting a pacemaker 
vulnerability to the FDA, or using US-CERT as an intermediary in the 
process.378 At least one commentator argues that if a security researcher notifies 
the vendor within 24-48 hours of his or her activities, it should provide a “safe-
harbor” in terms of CFAA liability.379
B. Legislative and Administrative Efforts to Date
Congress has realized the importance of ethical hacking on many occasions, 
primarily in proposed legislation initiatives. Recently, the Senate introduced a 
bipartisan “Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017”
bill, proposing, among other things, to amend the CFAA and DMCA to allow 
good-faith security research of “Internet-connected device(s)” used by a 
“department or agency of the United States.”380 The bill expands the notion of 
security research, which is already part of the DMCA exemption, to IoT devices 
used by the U.S. government and its agencies, removing the legal barriers if 
researchers follow a clear set of guidelines.381 This addresses part of the critique 
this Article makes of the current DMCA exemption for security research, which 
excludes a whole subset of Internet-connected devices.382
The bill also requests that IoT contractors certify that their devices do not 
have any known vulnerabilities and that they are patchable and follow industry-
standard protocols.383 More importantly, the bill empowers the National 
                                                                                                                     
thomasbrewster/2017/04/26/shadow-brokers-leaked-nsa-cyber-tools-become-weapons-of-
american-enemies/#7f7b42e71924 [https://perma.cc/A3JX-FD2W].
377 See Stockton & Golabek-Goldman, supra note 375, at 245 (“Transforming a 
vulnerability into a weaponized exploit may require significant investments of time, money, 
and resources.”). 
378 See Battery Performance Alert and Cybersecurity Firmware Updates for Certain 
Abbott (Formerly St. Jude Medical) Implantable Cardiac Devices: FDA Safety 
Communication, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm604706.htm [https://perma.cc/ZY65-UDPH] 
(explaining that “[t]he FDA takes reports of vulnerabilities in medical devices very 
seriously”).
379 See Kirsch, supra note 179, at 400 (offering a model for a safe harbor provision). 
380 See Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, S. 1691, 115th 
Cong. § 3(k)(1) (2017) [hereinafter IoT Bill]. 
381 See id. § 3(k)(2).
382 See, e.g., supra notes 288–290 and accompanying text.
383 See IoT Bill, § 3(a)(1)(A)(i).
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Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) to create guidelines, in 
consultation with security researchers, for vulnerability disclosure.384 At 
present, and as discussed below, there is no uniform federally mandated 
vulnerability disclosure procedure, and creating authoritative rules in this area 
is of the utmost importance.385 However, this bill creates only minimal 
standards of cybersecurity and includes exceptions that still leave many 
potential gaps.
Additionally, in response to the Jeep hack, the Senate introduced a bill that 
deals specifically with vehicle security by requiring isolation of critical software 
systems from other internal networks as well as penetration testing by security 
analysts and onboard systems to detect malicious activity.386 Considering that 
vehicle software may have as many as a hundred million lines of code, 
substantially more than other software, this vehicle-specific bill makes a lot of 
sense.387 This demonstrates the magnitude of potential individuals (and 
vehicles) affected by unpatched bugs, the fact that it was not the vehicle 
manufacturer that identified the vulnerability, and that Congress realizes the 
looming threat of Internet-connected vehicles running flawed software. This has 
also led the vehicle industry to invest more in cybersecurity efforts. 
Volkswagen, for example, has established its very own cybersecurity firm with 
the goal of preventing hacking.388
Recently, Congress, realizing how integral ethical hacking is to overall 
cybersecurity, has attempted to come up with a resolution that proactively 
promotes ethical hacking,389 including a bill creating a bug bounty program for 
vulnerabilities disclosed in a “Hack the Department of Homeland Security”
program.390 Other departments announced similar challenges for private 
                                                                                                                     
384 See id. § 3(b)(1). 
385 See id.
386 Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong. (2015). 
387 See David Gelles et al., Complex Car Software Becomes the Weak Spot Under the 
Hood, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/business/complex-car
-software-becomes-the-weak-spot-under-the-hood.html [on file with the Ohio State Law 
Journal] (noting high-end cars contain more than 100 million lines of code).
388 Michael Kan, Volkswagen Is Founding a New Cybersecurity Firm to Prevent Car 
Hacking, PCWORLD (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.pcworld.com/article/3120283/volkswag
en-is-founding-a-new-cybersecurity-firm-to-prevent-car-hacking.html [https://perma.cc/KY
68-QSHJ] (covering the creation of Volkswagen’s cybersecurity firm).
389 See Morgan Chalfant, Dem Pushes ‘Ethical Hacking’ Resolution, THE HILL (July 19, 
2017), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/342803-dem-pushes-ethical-hacking-
resolution [https://perma.cc/58VT-FCUJ] (explaining that Rep. Lou Correa (D-Calif.) 
introduced a resolution that would allow ethical hackers, who hack into computer networks 
and systems with the intent of identifying security vulnerabilities without malicious or 
criminal intent). 
390 See Maggie Hassan & Rob Portman, Why We’re Encouraging Ethical Hackers to 
Try and Hack the Department of Homeland Security, TIME (June 30, 2017), 
http://time.com/4837557/hackers-homeland-security-cyber-attacks [https://perma.cc/SHB6-
RTMG] (arguing that “one of the best ways to protect places like DHS is actually to recruit 
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citizens, including the Department of Defense (“Hack the Pentagon”),391 which 
also contacted the well-known vulnerability coordination platform 
HackerOne392 in order to facilitate a vulnerability disclosure program for private 
security researchers.393
C. Clarifying CFAA and DMCA Boundaries
Clarifying the boundaries of the CFAA, DMCA, and bug bounty contracts 
as pertaining to security researchers is immensely important.394 The CFAA’s
strict liability for access “without authorization” is certainly a major threat to 
security researchers.395 At the same time, it discourages talented researchers 
from engaging responsibly with vendors.396 Although there have been many 
calls to reform the CFAA in recent years,397 this Article advances a proposal 
focused on the DOJ, the prosecuting authority of the CFAA.398 The DOJ already 
acknowledged in the McDanel case that it had erred when it prosecuted an 
employee exposing a vulnerability in his employer’s product.399 This, however, 
is only one individual case and does not necessarily provide guidance for 
potential future prosecutions of security researchers engaged in vulnerability 
snooping.
                                                                                                                     
hackers to attempt to hack into its own systems and networks”); see also Hack DHS Act, 
H.R. 2774, 115th Cong. (2017). 
391 U.S. DIGITAL SERV., REPORT TO CONGRESS 59 (Dec. 2016), https://www.usds.gov/
report-to-congress/2016/hack-the-pentagon/ [https://perma.cc/B4M2-ZRHS] (discussing 
“Hack the Pentagon” program). 
392 About HackerOne, HACKERONE, https://www.hackerone.com/about [https://perma.cc/
W25Y-4NFE] (noting that HackerOne engages in “bug bounty” programs).
393 See Hack the Pentagon, HACKERONE, https://www.hackerone.com/resources/hack-
the-pentagon [https://perma.cc/ZVU6-CU9F] (noting that the first vulnerability was reported 
13 minutes after the launch of the program). 
394 See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (noting that creation of new 
crimes requires giving “fair warning . . . in a language that the common world will 
understand”). 
395 Katitza Rodriguez et al., Protecting Security Researchers’ Rights in the Americas,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.eff.org/wp/protecting-security-
researchers-rights-americas [https://perma.cc/L299-TRDT].
396 See Kerr, Vagueness, supra note 319, at 1561.
397 See also Jennifer Granick, Thoughts on Orin Kerr’s CFAA Reform Proposals: A 
Great Second Step, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y BLOG (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/thoughts-orin-kerrs-cfaa-reform-proposals-
great-second-step [https://perma.cc/AKJ5-78WS]. See generally Orin Kerr, Proposed 
Amendments to 18 U.S.C. 1030, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY BLOG (Jan. 20, 2013), 
http://volokh.com/2013/01/20/proposed-amendments-to-18-u-s-c-1030
[https://perma.cc/XVH4-TKC9] (suggesting possible amendments that could be made to the 
CFAA). 
398 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 36, at 129.
399 See Joseph Menn, U.S. Admits Convicted Man Is No Hacker, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 16, 
2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/oct/16/business/fi-squirrel16 [https://perma.cc/B2F
N-3RLN].
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The recommendation, therefore, is to facilitate publicly available CFAA 
enforcement guidelines in the context of security research. This would ensure 
that white- and gray-hat-hackers engaging in vulnerability research are aware of 
the boundaries and limitations and of their rights and duties. For example, a 
simple port scan, a basic operation used to learn about services running on a 
computer and entryways into the system, could lead to prosecution under the 
CFAA.400 While this is clearly absurd in the eyes of security researchers, law 
enforcement authorities may not have the same perspective. This is just one 
example of the many basic activities of security researchers on which the CFAA 
should elaborate, particularly in light of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
statement during the passage of Section 1030(a)(2) clarifying that “mere 
observation of the data” is enough to qualify as “obtaining information,”401 a
constitutive element of the crime of unauthorized access.402 This would place 
security researchers who do not copy, exfiltrate, or steal protected information 
under potential criminal liability.
Recently, the DOJ released to the public a Memorandum by the Attorney 
General setting guidelines for consistent law enforcement of “Computer Crime 
Matters.”403 While the Memorandum does acknowledge that federal criminal 
statutes “have not kept pace uniformly with developments in technology,” it 
does not acknowledge the emerging unsecure IoT ecosystem and the role of 
ethical hackers.404 The Memorandum offers certain factors for consideration in 
CFAA prosecutions, such as the sensitivity of the computer system affected, 
national security concerns, and any nexus to a larger criminal endeavor.405
The DMCA exemption for security research also raises questions in relation 
to scope and the meanings of key terms. Since exemptions expire after three 
years, requiring renewed submission of petitions for exemptions, that could be 
an opportunity to further clarify what a security research exemption means, 
                                                                                                                     
400 Though, a U.S. district court in Moulton v. VC3 ruled that a port scan is not in 
violation of the CFAA, its decision does not have binding authority. See Moulton v. VC3, 
No. 1:00CV434-TWT, 2000 WL 33310901, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2000).
401 S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY REP. NO. 99 432, at 6–7 (1986).
402 Id. (“Because the premise of this subsection is privacy protection, the Committee 
wishes to make clear that ‘obtaining information’ in this context includes mere observation 
of the data. Actual asportation, in the sense of physically removing the data from its original 
location or transcribing the data, need not be proved in order to establish a violation of this 
subsection.”).
403 See generally Memorandum, Office of the Att’y Gen. to the U.S. Att’ys & Assistant 
Att’y Gens. for the Criminal & Nat’l Sec. Divs., Intake and Charging Policy for Computer 
Crime Matters (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/904941/down
load [https://perma.cc/E7YJ-AJB5] (explaining new policy to guide “prosecutors 
contemplating charges under the CFAA”). 
404 Id.
405 See id. at 1–2.
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especially when it comes to devices not for individual consumer use, and the 
meaning of “controlled environment” in the age of cloud computing.406
So far, it appears that the Department of Justice is expected to take a liberal 
approach to the next iteration of the DMCA security research exemption.407 In 
its comments for the next triennial rulemaking process, the DOJ emphasizes it’s
“support for legitimate security research and its appreciation of how such 
research benefits the public by identifying errors and vulnerabilities in software, 
digital devices and networks, developing solutions to fix them, and preventing 
them from being exploited by criminals.”408
In the same letter, the DOJ addresses many of the challenges addressed by 
this Article in relation with the DMCA.409 First, it notes that the rationale behind 
the scope of devices covered by the exemption is unclear, recommending an 
expansion of that scope to include devices not primarily designed for individual 
use.410 Second, it objects to the “Controlled Environment Limitation,”
suggesting that some security research needs to take place in real world 
circumstances.411 Third, it asks whether “lawfully acquired” is a necessary 
condition for the legitimacy of security research.412 Overall, it illustrates a 
conceptual shift which recognizes that security research should not be restricted 
by arbitrary and unnecessary requirements, as provided by the sixth triennial 
review security research exemption.413
D. Requiring Built-In Patchability in IoT Devices
The important work of security researchers in the field of IoT security will 
not bear any fruit if IoT devices cannot be patched in the first place. While 
computer users generally have control over what they install, this is not 
necessarily the case in the IoT context, where users have limited control over 
security features and have to trust the vendor to ensure up-to-date and secure 
software.414 This means that regulators would have to require vendors to 
                                                                                                                     
406 See Erik Stallman, The Current DMCA Exemption Process Is a Computer Security 
Vulnerability, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/the-
current-dmca-exemption-process-is-a-computer-security-vulnerability 
[https://perma.cc/8QT3-PQAT] (arguing that security research may take more than three 
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407 See generally Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Computer Crime & Intellectual Prop. 
Sec., to Regan Smith, Gen. Counsel & Assoc. Register of Copyrights (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/1075496/download 
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Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
408 Id. at 2.
409 Id.
410 Id. at 4.
411 Id.
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413 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 407, at 6.
414 See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at v. 
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manufacture IoT devices that can be patched if security flaws are discovered. 
The reality is that the market does not incentivize vendors to do so; we must 
therefore consider a regulatory approach.415
Patchability has been an important topic of discussion in the IoT regulation 
context. Many agencies, including the FTC and NTIA, have been strong 
proponents of patchability as a requirement for responsible IoT 
manufacturing.416 Patching is a substantial part of overall security, but it is by 
no means a magic solution. Many users do not patch their software (if given a
choice);417 certain organizations, such as hospitals and power plants, cannot 
patch immediately due to concerns that the patch may create functionality 
problems;418 and patches often have flaws themselves.419
E. Privacy Tort Law Solutions 
Allowing individual hackers to perform security research may put privacy 
at risk should researchers encounter sensitive private information.420 Users 
                                                                                                                     
415 See Paez & La Marca, supra note 111, at 53 (“[M]anufacturers often lack an 
economic incentive to provide software updates and support: manufacturers of specialized 
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product to support the new chip. In this mindset, where getting the product to the market is 
the overwhelming priority, security may not be a priority.”).
416 See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENT LETTER ON “COMMUNICATING IOT
DEVICE SECURITY UPDATE CAPABILITY TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY FOR CONSUMERS” (June 
2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ advocacy_documents/ ftc-comment-
national-telecommunications-information-administration-communicating-iot-device-
security/170619ntiaiotcomment.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HFE-BT9R] (discussing the FTC’s 
position on IoT security upgradability and patching); NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.,
MULTISTAKEHOLDER PROCESS; INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) SECURITY UPGRADABILITY AND 
PATCHING (July 18, 2017), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2016/multistake
holder-process-iot-security [https://perma.cc/5KSP-S99G] (discussing the NTIA). 
417 Immunizing the Internet, supra note 17, at 2449.
418 See, e.g., Dell Cameron, The Systems That Control Water and Power Plants Are 
Shockingly Vulnerable to Hackers, Study Finds, GIZMODO (May 3, 2018), 
https://gizmodo.com/the-systems-that-control-water-and-power-plants-are-sho-182574094
5 [https://perma.cc/9BH3-P735] (power plants); Adam Rubenfire, A Smarter Anti-Hacker 
Defense, MODERN HEALTHCARE, https://www.modernhealthcare.com/reports
/cybersecurity/#!/ [https://perma.cc/9BH3-P735] (hospitals); Evan Sweeney, For Hospitals 
Defending Against Cyberattacks, Patch Management Remains a Struggle, FIERCE 
HEALTHCARE (May 17, 2017), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/privacy-security/for-
hospitals-defending-against-cyberattacks-patch-management-remains-a-struggle
[https://perma.cc/64RZ-54PR].
419 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 27, at 787. 
420 Some guidance could be provided by laws dealing with the protection of certain types 
of information. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (2010) (Health Insurance Portability and 
Accessibility Act—HIPAA) (providing the security standards for electronic protected health 
information). 
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whose private information is compromised or disseminated to the public should 
have legal recourse. In this context, privacy tort law may provide a partial 
remedy for informational harms caused by security research, even in cases 
where the private information is not otherwise protected by data protection 
laws.421 Recent literature focuses on two torts—intrusion upon seclusion and 
publicity given to private life.422
So far, courts have largely dismissed data breach lawsuits by consumers 
against vendors, ruling that if consumers do not suffer quantifiable harm, there 
is no legal cause of action.423 These, however, are lawsuits against vendors; 
courts may reach a different conclusion if the defendant is a security researcher 
who overstepped the boundaries of his or her specific research, though proving 
harm will still be a necessary component.424
F. Vulnerability Disclosure Procedure
The process by which vulnerabilities are disclosed has been a contentious 
topic in recent years.425 Vulnerability disclosure426 is essentially a double-edged 
sword; the benefits extracted from it are largely dependent on the methods of 
disclosure, including the parties who learn about it and what they decide to do 
with that information.427 Intuition suggests that once security researchers 
                                                                                                                     
421 See Tran, supra note 157, at 266.
422 See id. at 280. 
423 See The Liability of Technology Companies for Data Breaches, ZURICH (ADVISEN) 5
(2010), https://www.advisen.com/downloads/Emerging_Cyber_Tech.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ENA-WAKT] (“Legal experts note that the majority of courts have 
rejected data breach claims brought by affected persons that did not suffer any appreciable 
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424 See U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR SECURING THE 
INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT), at 5 (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/Strategic_Principles_for_Securing_the_Internet_of_Things-2016-1115-FIN
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established body of case law addressing IoT context, traditional tort principles of product
liability can be expected to apply”).
425 Brenner, supra note 14, at 405 (arguing that the controversy about vulnerability 
disclosure is over how the information is disseminated); see, e.g., BugTraq: Frequently 
Asked Questions, SECURITY FOCUS ONLINE, https://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/desc
ription [https://perma.cc/2LYY-QE88]; Scott Culp, It’s Time to End Information Anarchy,
MICROSOFT SECURITY ESSAYS (Oct. 2001), http://www.angelfire.com/ky/microsfot/timeTo
End.html [https://perma.cc/CK54-SBNB].
426 See AMRIT T. WILLIAMS ET AL., RESPONSIBLE VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE:
GUIDANCE FOR RESEARCHERS, VENDORS AND END USERS, GARTNER 3 (Oct. 17, 2006), 
http://attrition.org/misc/ee/gartner-responsible_disclosure-144061.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV
S5-SB6R] (“Publicity over vulnerabilities in software products is a double-edged sword. 
Making vulnerabilities public has, unfortunately, proved necessary to spur some software 
vendors to invest in better software development, patch production and patch distribution 
processes. However, it has also enabled attackers to more quickly produce exploits.”).
427 See id.
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identify a vulnerability, they should disclose it to the relevant party, who would 
in turn fix or patch the flaw, thereby enhancing the overall security of the 
software.428 In the words of then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter this would be 
the equivalent of a “‘see something, say something’ policy for the digital 
domain.”429 Reality, however, has been slightly more complicated than that. 
While disclosing vulnerabilities to the vendor was the norm for many years, 
security researchers became increasingly frustrated because they were often 
ignored by vendors, who were reluctant investigate reported vulnerabilities.430
At that point, researchers published only very limited information about the 
existence of a vulnerability to the public, which resulted in some vendors 
claiming these vulnerabilities were “theoretical.”431 Only when security 
researchers finally published the information they had to the public in full did 
vendors start taking these matters seriously.432 This has led to a fragmentation 
of the philosophy on vulnerability disclosure.433 While certain experts advocate 
for “responsible disclosure,” which primarily focuses on disclosing 
vulnerabilities to the vendor, there is a strong group of experts who oppose that 
approach and argue for “full disclosure,” encouraging security researchers to 
publish the flaws they have identified to the broader public and assuming the 
vendor will then be pressured to fix the flaw more promptly.434 There is a 
substantial group of individuals and organizations who adopt the 
“nondisclosure” approach to vulnerabilities, mainly black hats and intelligence 
agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA).435
1. Responsible Disclosure
Responsible disclosure typically refers to reporting a vulnerability to the 
relevant vendor and allowing the vendor a certain amount of time to fix the 
                                                                                                                     
428 See Bruce Schneier, Schneier: Full Disclosure of Security Vulnerabilities a ‘Damned 
Good Idea,’ SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Jan. 9, 2007), https://www.schneier.com/essays/
archives/2007/01/schneier_full_disclo.html [https://perma.cc/V4DE-NLL4].
429 See U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., supra note 46.
430 See Schneier, supra note 428.
431 See id.
432 See id.
433 See Marc Laliberte, A Look Inside Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure, DARK 
READING (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/a-look-inside-
responsible-vulnerability-disclosure/a/d-id/1327800 [https://perma.cc/T54M-PVZ8].
434 Freeman, supra note 36, at 128.
435 See generally Bruce Schneier, The NSA Is Hoarding Vulnerabilities, SCHNEIER ON 
SECURITY (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/08/the_nsa_is_
hoar.html [https://perma.cc/SK5R-7769] (explaining how the NSA is hoarding 
vulnerabilities of software used both by private and governmental entities, including 
companies like Cisco, Fortinet, TOPSEC, and more. A portion of these vulnerabilities were 
patched since, but some vulnerabilities were still unknown until a group named Shadow 
Brokers leaked 300 megabytes worth of NSA-hoarded vulnerabilities). 
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vulnerability, depending on its complexity and other circumstances.436 This type 
of disclosure is the most commonly used approach by vendors, who naturally 
prefer to learn about the vulnerability before other parties or the public.437
Initially, the DMCA exemption for security research was expected to include a 
requirement of responsible disclosure as part of its good-faith term.438 However, 
the Librarian of Congress noted that the community was divided on what
constituted responsible disclosure and that therefore the DMCA rulemaking did 
not require responsible disclosure, or any other type of disclosure, other than 
requiring that information gathered be used primarily “to promote the security 
or safety” of the device in question.439
This is not to say that the public will not learn about the vulnerability; rather, 
such information will be released to the public only once a patch is released and 
the risk of exploitation by third parties decreases.440 Another variation of 
                                                                                                                     
436 See Laliberte, supra note 433 (“First, the researcher identifies a security vulnerability 
and its potential impact . . . . Next, the researcher creates a vulnerability advisory report 
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437 See, e.g., Art Manion, Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, CERT COORDINATION CTR.
(Feb. 19, 2018), http://www.cert.org/vulnerability-analysis/vul-disclosure.cfm? [https://perma.cc
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440 See Stephen Lynch, Full Disclosure: Infosec Industry Still Fighting Over 
Vulnerability Reporting, CISCO UMBRELLA (Oct. 16, 2015), https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog
/blog/2015/10/16/full-disclosure-infosec-industry-still-fighting [https://perma.cc/3JQV-
AX4T].
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responsible disclosure is reporting all information regarding the vulnerability to 
the vendor while disclosing only limited information, excluding the proof of 
concept, to the public.441 However, even that approach does not necessarily 
prevent malicious hackers from reverse-engineering the general vulnerability 
information that is provided to the public.442 The general idea is to ensure that 
the public will not be able to directly use the information to exploit the 
vulnerability.
2. Full Disclosure
Full disclosure, unlike responsible disclosure, is the practice of reporting a 
vulnerability to the public to the fullest extent possible and without informing 
the vendor of it beforehand.443 The practice of full disclosure is evidence of 
some of the frustration of the security research community resulting from 
vendors sometimes ignoring vulnerabilities reported to them.444 It is immensely 
controversial because it allows equal access to information about a vulnerability 
to vendors and to potential exploiters.445 The idea behind full disclosure is to 
pressure the vendor to patch the vulnerability since public scrutiny is a strong 
motivation for vendors to take security seriously.446 Bruce Schneier, a supporter 
of the full disclosure practice, called it a “damned good idea,”447 and many 
others agree.448
However, full disclosure is not always a provocative step against vendors. 
It is often used to publish information about a vulnerability so that customers 
can protect themselves from exploitation, given that the vendor will either
ignore or take too long to fix the flaw.449 Many assume that full disclosure 
                                                                                                                     
441 See Coders’ Rights Project Vulnerability Reporting FAQ, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/coders/vulnerability-reporting-faq [https://perma.cc/LB
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449 See Schneier, supra note 444.
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allows malicious actors to exploit vulnerabilities published by security 
researchers, but there is an assumption that black-hat hackers are aware of 
certain vulnerabilities, if not sold to them in the zero-day vulnerability 
market.450
3. The Road Forward on Vulnerability Disclosure
This subpart has demonstrated that the debate over vulnerability disclosure 
stems from distrust between security researchers and vendors.451 But security 
researchers could regain their trust in vendors, and vice versa, if a robust form 
of oversight is implemented. This can be achieved by relying on intermediaries 
and enforcers of norms in that context—for example, US-CERT and the FTC. 
Primarily, this will require official guidelines from an authoritative body (the 
FTC, for example) regarding how to responsibly disclose vulnerabilities in a 
way that properly balances vendors’ interests and the need for cybersecurity.
G. Transnational Law Enforcement and Reducing National Security 
Threats
The DOJ recently indicted a group of Russian FSB officers who were 
involved in hacking Yahoo!, gaining access to as many as 500 million e-mail 
accounts.452 Transnational law enforcement is expensive and resource-
intensive. In an environment friendlier to ethical hacking, where tech companies 
do not threaten security researchers, such a massive data breach could have been 
prevented. In addition, the FBI has already admitted that it is losing the “war on 
hackers,”453 which indicates that law enforcement may be increasingly inclined 
to consider “alternative architectures that are more secure” in the first place.454
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Patching vulnerabilities before foreign governments learn about them could 
enhance overall national security. If we assume that national security includes 
dams, transportation, healthcare, and other sectors operating on information 
technology, we might also conclude that patching vulnerabilities in advance 
would keep foreign malicious actors largely at bay, since their options to attack 
the cyber infrastructure would be limited to only zero-day vulnerabilities, which 
would be far more limited than the number of vulnerabilities that could be 
identified by ethical hackers and patched by the manufacturer. 
H. Tackling Security by Obscurity
The concept of security by obscurity provides that keeping the code for a 
particular piece of software, and therefore vulnerabilities in that code, hidden 
and unknown to hackers can make the software seemingly more secure.455 In 
software engineering, this is sometimes called “obfuscation.”456 Vendors may 
make their code overly complex or ridden with gibberish code lines in order to 
confuse a potential attacker.457 But this has not worked in the past,458 and it will 
not work in the future. In today’s cybersecurity world, it is almost impossible to 
hide vulnerabilities; the only way to prevent their exploitation is to patch them 
and get rid of them.459 Security by obscurity also violates Kerckhoff’s
principle,460 which posits that the public release of a system should not be to its 
                                                                                                                     
455 See Yana Welinder, Facing Real-Time Identification in Mobile Apps & Wearable 
Computers, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 89, 128 (2013).
456 Brian Fitzgerald, Innovation, Software, and Reverse Engineering, 18 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 121, 131 (2001) (“[C]ode obfuscation consists of a process by 
which code contains sufficient decoys to obstruct reverse engineering.”). 
457 See Jesper M. Johansson & Roger Grimes, The Great Debate: Security by Obscurity,
MICROSOFT TECHNET MAG. (Sept. 7, 2016), https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/20
08.06.obscurity.aspx [https://perma.cc/52ZC-H8NC].
458 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 448.
459 Michael Gegick & Sean Barnum, Never Assuming That Your Secrets Are Safe, US-
CERT (Sept. 14, 2005), https://www.us-cert.gov/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/never-
assuming-that-your-secrets-are-safe [https://perma.cc/UBB2-JF9H] (“Always assume that 
an attacker knows everything that you know -- assume the attacker has access to all source 
code and all designs. Even if this is not true, it is trivially easy for an attacker to determine 
obscured information.”) (citing Michael Howard & David LeBlanc, Chapter 3: Security 
Principles to Live By, in NEVER DEPEND ON SECURITY THROUGH OBSCURITY ALONE 66–67 
(2d ed. 2003)).
460 See Johansson & Grimes, supra note 457 (“Security by obscurity is, in a nutshell, a 
violation of Kerckhoffs’ Principle, which holds that a system should be secure because of its 
design, not because the design is unknown to an adversary. The basic premise of Kerckhoffs’
Principle is that secrets don’t remain secret for very long.”). But see Corey Nachreiner, How
a Little Obscurity Can Bolster Security, DARK READING (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://www.darkreading.com/risk/how-a-little-obscurity-can-bolster-security/d/d-
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detriment, since systems should be secure by design, not due to their confusing 
nature.461
This shows that the emphasis on securing IoT devices should be on 
revealing vulnerabilities, possibly providing an incentive for individuals to do 
so, as well as on patching those vulnerabilities, which is the responsibility of the 
vendor. 
In this regard, the FTC can play an important role. The FTC has been 
recently actively enforcing consumer privacy based on Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
or affecting commerce.”462 The FTC has become a de facto data protection 
authority.463 Given that the degree of privacy could be affected by the strength 
of security, the FTC ought to ensure that companies do not engage in practices 
that could compromise private information belonging to consumers, with 
security by obscurity being one of those practices.464 Furthermore, the Third 
Circuit in FTC v. Wyndham held that the FTC has authority to sue for inadequate 
security practices.465
This common law of FTC privacy enforcement could lead to stronger 
enforcement against companies who do not act according to industry best 
practices of privacy and security.466 Security by obscurity, a practice that certain 
vendors adopt in order to avoid vulnerability detection,467 should be treated as 
a deceptive or unfair practice in the same way the FTC deals with other security-
violating practices.468 The FTC has already pursued action against an IoT 
vendor, TRENDnet, in a claim that its smart webcams did not provide 
consumers with “reasonable security to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive 
information, namely the live feeds from the IP cameras.”469 It is anticipated that 
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the FTC will pursue further enforcement against IoT vendors who engage in 
unfair or deceptive security or privacy practices, which should encompass 
practices like security by obscurity and, perhaps, unwillingness to respond to 
vulnerability disclosures.470
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the DMCA, CFAA, and certain contractual 
prohibitions impede security research into software vulnerabilities, which are 
on the rise in the emerging IoT ecosystem due to an industry-specific market 
failure. Contractual language could also put security researchers in legal 
jeopardy should it not contain safe harbor and authorization provisions. These 
legal barriers discourage security researchers from discovering flaws and 
reporting them to the relevant vendors, which would enhance overall privacy 
and security. This could be partially resolved by mitigating the threat of legal 
jeopardy through a further development of the DMCA exemption and
reconsideration of the CFAA boundaries as well as by enacting legal and 
regulatory adaptations such as requiring patchability in IoT, tackling security 
by obscurity, and enforcing the law against noncomplying vendors. This will 
create a friendly and fruitful environment for security research, leading to a 
more secure IoT ecosystem and, ultimately, a more secure Internet system.
The IoT ecosystem creates a host of opportunities but also a variety of risks 
and dangers, which should be addressed through legitimizing the activities of 
the community of dedicated vulnerability hunters. Security research is important 
where market forces fail and where vendors are unlikely to discover 
vulnerabilities on their own, which they currently lack the incentive to do. Broad 
interpretation of these “anti-hacking” laws is resulting in a less secure Internet, 
and the stakes are constantly increasing given the ubiquity of sensors and 
physicality of the IoT ecosystem. 
The law should clearly distinguish between white- and gray-hat hackers, 
whose purpose is to fix flaws (to varying degrees), and black-hat hackers, who 
use vulnerabilities for criminal ends. This distinction has been overlooked for 
too long, and IoT ought to be a turning point in that regard, creating a space for 
benevolent actors to fully utilize their talent.
                                                                                                                     
of infants sleeping in their cribs, young children playing, and adults engaging in typical daily 
activities.”) (cited in Tran, supra note 157, at 276–77).
470 See Hetcher, supra note 463, at 131.
